PROSECUTION UNDER UP GANGSTERS ACT PERMISSIBLE EVEN IN CASE OF A SINGLE FIR FOR ANTI-SOCIAL ACTIVITIES: SUPREME COURT - Business Guardian
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PROSECUTION UNDER UP GANGSTERS ACT PERMISSIBLE EVEN IN CASE OF A SINGLE FIR FOR ANTI-SOCIAL ACTIVITIES: SUPREME COURT

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In a significant development, we saw how just as recently as on April 26, 2022, the Apex Court in a brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment titled Shraddha Gupta vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others in Criminal Appeal Nos. 569-570 of 2022 observed that there can be prosecution against a person under Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, even in case of a single offence/FIR/charge sheet for any of the anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act. We saw how in this case, the Allahabad High Court had refused to quash the proceedings against the accused under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. The crux of this judgment can be stated thus as noted in judgment itself that, “Even a single crime committed by a ‘Gang’ is sufficient to implant Gangsters Act on such members of the ‘Gang’ – There can be prosecution against a person even in case of a single offence/FIR/charge sheet for any of the anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act provided such an anti-social activity is by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person. (Para 9-10).”

To start with, this extremely commendable, cogent, composed, courageous and creditworthy judgment authored by Justice MR Shah for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of himself and Justice BV Nagarathna sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 27.09.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 21964 of 2019 and the subsequent order dated 10.11.2020 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Review Application No. 2/2019, the original accused, Shraddha Gupta, against whom an FIR has been filed under Section 2/3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Gangsters Act, 1986’), has filed the present appeals.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 2 while dwelling on facts that, “The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under:

That a written report was made by respondent no.4 herein (original informant) on 24.05.2016 to the effect that her sister and her family members had previous enmity with the accused persons, namely, (1) Shravan Kumar (husband of the appellant herein), (2) Guddu @ Sudhanshu, (3) Munna @ Brajendranth Sharma, (4) Kamal Sharma and (5) Bhure. That on 23.5.2016, her sister Kumari Sadhna Sharma, Incharge, DGC(Crl.) in the Court of the District Judge, Badaun, had gone to the Court on her scooty to pursue the cases on behalf of the Government. Bhure and others had a hearing date in the Court of District Judge, Badaun for appearance. At about 5:30 p.m. her sister was returning from Badaun to Ujhani, sitting on the rear seat of the scooty being driven by her servant Bihari. When the scooty reached near Balaji temple, they saw a car parked near the temple in which all the abovenamed accused were present. The car followed the scooty of her sister Sadhna and when she reached near Jiorlia village, the car of the accused rammed into her sister’s scooty with the result both Sadhna and Behari fell on the road. Then the accused drove their car towards her sister, stopped it near Behari and shouted, ‘kill this fellow also otherwise he may also give evidence’. The accused, however, ran away on the arrival of the people. The incident was witnessed by the passer-by and with their help Behari took her sister to Badaun hospital in a vehicle. Her sister Sadhna died in the hospital. The complainant further stated that she had come to the hospital at 11:00 on getting the information and lost her consciousness on seeing the dead body of her sister. The autopsy of the deceased was conducted in the night. When she regained her consciousness, Behari told her the entire incident. After making arrangements for the last rites of her sister, she came to the police station to lodge the report. The complainant alleged that she apprehends the association of the former BJP MLA Yogender Sagar in the entire conspiracy. On the basis of this report, a case under Section 147 , 304, 504, 323, 506, 120-B IPC was registered against the above named six accused persons at P.S. Ujhani, District Badaun, vide Case Crime No. 337/2016 dated 24.05.2016.

2.1 That subsequently on 27.05.2017, a case under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act, 1986 was registered against eight accused persons vide Case Crime No. 268/2017. The charge sheet was filed against the said eight accused persons on 26.5.2018 and the cognizance of the same was taken by the learned Special Judge under the Gangsters Act, Badaun on 2.7.2018.

2.2 It appears that thereafter on further investigation and on the basis of the call recordings between the co-accused, handed over to the Investigating Officer by the complainant, the names of the appellant – Shraddha Gupta, her husband Sharvan Gupta and Kamlesh Sharma, came to light and accordingly they were arrayed as accused in Case Crime No. 337/2016.

2.3 That in the course of investigation, it also revealed that the appellant – Shraddha Gupta, her husband – Sharvan Gupta and Kamlesh Sharma were also involved in the offence pertaining to the conspiracy of murder of deceased Sadhna Sharma. Therefore, supplementary charge sheet was also filed against the aforesaid three accused persons, namely, Shraddha Gupta, Sharvan Gupta and Kamlesh Sharma. That subsequently, it was brought to the notice of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Badaun, that the case under the Gangsters Act, 1986 has been registered only against eight accused persons and the charge sheet has been filed against eleven accused persons in Case Crime No. 337/2016.

2.4 Thereafter, a gang chart was prepared against the appellant and other two accused, which was sent to the Senior Superintendent of Police, District Badaun on 19.03.2019. That thereafter the Joint Director (Prosecution), Badaun granted approval on 1.4.2019 to register a case against the aforesaid three persons under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act, 1986. SSP, Badaun, vide communication dated 2.4.2019 communicated to the Investigating Officer and accordingly FIR dated 27.05.2019 in Case Crime No. 268/2017 under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act has been lodged/registered against the appellant and other two co-accused. Thus, the FIR for the offences under the Gangsters Act has been registered against eleven accused in all (eight accused charged earlier and the three accused including the appellant herein charge sheeted subsequently).

2.5 That the appellant herein filed the present Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 21964/2019 before the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and prayed for the following reliefs:

i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the orders dated 7.6.2019 and 2.4.2019 passed by the respondent no.3;

ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned FIR dated 27.5.2017 as Case Crime No. 268/2017 under Section 2/3 Gangsters Act, P.S. Ujhani, Dist. Badaun, only to the extent of the petitioner;

iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding respondents no. 2 and 3 not to arrest the petitioner in case Crime No. 268/2017 under Sections 2/3 Gangsters Act, P.S. Ujhani, District Badaun.

2.6 It was the case on behalf of the appellant that she has been falsely implicated in the case; she was not named in the FIR; in the FIR, no role has been assigned to her; her name has surfaced in further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.; the Senior Superintendent of Police, Badaun maliciously submitted the supplementary gang chart against her approved by the District Magistrate, Badaun; that she is neither a gang leader nor a member of the gang being a household lady. It was also the case on behalf of the appellant-accused that solely on the basis of the single FIR/charge sheet, she cannot be charged for the offences under the provisions of the Gangsters Act.

2.7 That by the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the said writ petition and has refused to quash the criminal proceedings under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act. A review application was also filed which has also been dismissed.

2.8 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned orders passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and dismissing the review application, the accused Shraddha Gupta has preferred the present appeals.”

Simply put, the Bench then enunciates in para 6 that, “The short question which is posed for the consideration of this Court is, whether, a person against whom a single FIR/charge sheet is filed for any of the anti-social activities mentioned in section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act, 1986 can be prosecuted under the Gangsters Act. In other words, whether a single crime committed by a ‘Gangster’ is sufficient to apply the Gangsters Act on such members of a ‘Gang’.”

It deserves mentioning that the Bench then observes in para 7 that, “While considering the aforesaid issues/questions, the relevant provisions of the Gangsters Act, 1986 are required to be referred to. The object and purpose of enactment of the Gangsters Act, 1986 is to make special provisions for the prevention of, for coping with, gangsters and anti-social activities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(b) defines ‘Gang’ and Section 2(c) defines ‘Gangster’. Sections 2(b) and 2(c) read as under:

“2(b) “Gang” means a group of persons, who acting either singly or collectively, by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person, indulge in anti-social activities (Act no. 2 of 1974), namely—

(i) offences punishable under Chapter XVI, or Chapter XVII, or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Act no. 45 of 1860), or

(ii) distilling or manufacturing or storing or transporting or importing or exporting or selling or distributing any liquor, or intoxicating or dangerous drugs, or other intoxicants or narcotics or cultivating any plant, in contravention of any of the provisions of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 ( U.P. Act no. 4 of 1910) or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 or any other law for the time being in force, or

(iii) occupying or talking possession of immovable property otherwise than in accordance with law, or setting-up false claims for title or possession of immovable property whether in himself or any other person, or (Act no. 61 of 1985)

(iv) preventing or attempting to prevent any public servant or any witness from discharging his lawful duties, or

(v) offences punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Art, 1956, or

(vi) offences punishable under section 3 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 ( Act no. 104 of 1956), or

(vii) preventing any person from offering bids in auction lawfully conducted, or tender, lawfully invited, by or on behalf of any Government department, local body or public or private undertaking for any lease or right or supply of goods or work to be done, or

(viii) preventing or disturbing the smooth running by any person of his lawful business profession, trade or employment or any other lawful activity connected therewith, or

(ix) offences punishable under section 171-E of the Indian Penal Code, or in preventing or obstructing any public election being lawfully held, by physically preventing the voter from exercising his electoral rights, or

(x) inciting others to resort to violence to disturb communal harmony, or

(xi) creating panic, alarm or terror in public, or

(xii) terrorising or assaulting employees or owners or occupiers of public or private undertakings or factories and causing mischief in respect of their properties, or

(xiii) inducing or attempting to induce any person to go to foreign countries on false representation that any employment, trade or profession shall be provided to him in such foreign country, or

(xiv) kidnapping or abducting any person with intent to extort ransom, or

(xv) diverting or otherwise preventing any aircraft or public transport vehicle from following its scheduled course;

(c) “gangster” means a member or leader or organiser of a gang and includes any person who abets or assists in the activities of a gang enumerated in clause (b), whether before or after the commission of such activities or harbours any person who has indulged in such activities.”

7.1 Section 3 of the Gangsters Act, 1986 provides for punishment, which reads as under:

“3. (1) A gangster shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than two years and which may extend to ten years and also with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees:

Provided that a gangster who commits an offence against the person of a public servant of the person of a member of the family of a public servant shall be punished Kith imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years and also with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees,

(2) Whoever being a public servant renders any illegal help or support in any manner to a gangster, whether before or after the Commission of any offence by the gangster (whether by himself or through others) or abstains from taking lawful measures or intentionally avoids to carry out the directions of any court or of his superior officers, in this respect, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years but shall not be less than three years and also with fine.”

7.2 Section 5 of the Gangsters Act provides for constitution of Special Courts for the speedy trial of the offences under the Act. Section 6 provides that a Special Court may, if it considers it expedient or desirable so to do, hold its sitting for any of its proceedings at any place, other than the ordinary place of its sitting or seat. Section 8 of the Act provides that when trying any offence punishable under the Gangsters Act, a Special Court may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under any other law for the time being in force, be charged at the same trial. Under Section 9 of the Gangsters Act, the State Government shall appoint a person to be the Public Prosecutor for every Special Court. Section 10 provides that a Special Court may take cognizance of any offence triable by it, without the accused being committed to it for trial upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts. Section 12 provides that the trial under the Gangsters Act of any offence by Special Court shall have precedence over the trial of any other case against the accused in any other court ( not being a Special Court) and shall be concluded in preference to the trial of such other case and accordingly the trial of such other case shall remain in abeyance. Section 13 of the Gangsters Act provides that where, after taking cognizance of any offence, a Special Court is opinion that the offence is not triable by it, it shall, notwithstanding that it has no jurisdiction to try such an offence, transfer the case for trial of such offence to any other court having jurisdiction under the Code and the court to which the case is transferred may proceed with the trial of the offence as if it has taken cognizance of the offence.”

It can be thus surmised from what is stated above as noted in para 8 that, “From the aforesaid, it can be seen that all provisions are to ensure that the offences under the Gangsters Act should be given preference and should be tried expeditiously and that too, by the Special Courts, to achieve the object and purpose of the enactment of the Gangsters Act.”

Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to unequivocally state in para 9 that, “Now so far as the main submission on behalf of the accused that for a single offence/FIR/charge sheet with respect to any of the antisocial activities, such an accused cannot be prosecuted under the Gangsters Act, 1986 is concerned, on a fair reading of the definitions of ‘Gang’ and ‘Gangster’ under the Gangsters Act, 1986, it can be seen that a ‘Gang’ is a group of one or more persons who commit/s the crimes mentioned in the definition clause for the motive of earning undue advantage, whether pecuniary, material or otherwise. Even a single crime committed by a ‘Gang’ is sufficient to implant Gangsters Act on such members of the ‘Gang’. The definition clause does not engulf plurality of offence before the Gangsters Act is invoked.

A group of persons may act collectively or anyone of the members of the group may also act singly, with the object of disturbing public order indulging in anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act, who can be termed as ‘Gangster’. A member of a ‘Gang’ acting either singly or collectively may be termed as a member of the ‘Gang’ and comes within the definition of ‘Gang’, provided he/she is found to have indulged in any of the anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act.”

No less significant is what is then stated in para 10 that, “On a fair reading of the definitions of ‘Gang’ contained in Section 2(b) and ‘Gangster’ contained in Section 2(c) of the Gangsters Act, a ‘Gangster’ means a member or leader or organiser of a gang including any person who abets or assists in the activities of a gang enumerated in clause (b) of Section 2, who either acting singly or collectively commits and indulges in any of the anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) can be said to have committed the offence under the Gangsters Act and can be prosecuted and punished for the offence under the Gangsters Act. There is no specific provision under the Gangsters Act, 1986 like the specific provisions under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 and the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organized Crime Act, 2015 that while prosecuting an accused under the Gangsters Act, there shall be more than one offence or the FIR/charge sheet. As per the settled position of law, the provisions of the statute are to be read and considered as it is. Therefore, considering the provisions under the Gangsters Act, 1986 as they are, even in case of a single offence/FIR/charge sheet, if it is found that the accused is a member of a ‘Gang’ and has indulged in any of the anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Gangsters Act, such as, by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person and he/she can be termed as ‘Gangster’ within the definition of Section 2(c) of the Act, he/she can be prosecuted for the offences under the Gangsters Act. Therefore, so far as the Gangsters Act, 1986 is concerned, there can be prosecution against a person even in case of a single offence/FIR/charge sheet for any of the anti-social activities mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act provided such an anti-social activity is by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself or any other person.”

As we see, the Bench then points out in para 11 that, “In the present case, it is alleged that the main accused P.C. Sharma was a gang leader and who was the mastermind and he hatched the criminal conspiracy along with other co-accused including the appellant herein to commit the murder of the deceased Sadhna Sharma for a pecuniary benefit as there was a property dispute going on since long between the family members. It is also to be noted that the other co-accused were already charge sheeted/prosecuted for the offence under the Gangsters Act and therefore the appellant and the other two co-accused being members of the ‘Gang’ were also required to be prosecuted for the offences under the Gangsters Act also like other co-accused. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that no prosecution could have been initiated against the appellant-accused for the offences under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act, 1986.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 12 that, “In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above, the High Court has rightly refused to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellant-accused under Sections 2/3 of the Gangsters Act, 1986, in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Under the circumstances, the present appeals fail and the same deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.”

In conclusion, the Apex Court has made it indubitably clear that the prosecution under the UP Gangsters Act is permissible even in case of single FIR/charge sheet for anti-social activities. It thus merits no reiteration that the Apex Court has very rightly refused to quash the criminal proceedings against the accused under the UP Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. There can be just no denying or disputing it!

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court holds off on decision in Baba Ramdev contempt case

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The Supreme Court has deferred its decision on a contempt notice issued against yoga guru Ramdev, his associate Balkrishna, and their company Patanjali Ayurved in connection with a case involving misleading advertisements. The bench, comprising Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, stated, “Orders on the contempt notice issued to respondents 5 to 7 (Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, Balkrishna, and Ramdev) are reserved.” The Uttarakhand State Licensing Authority (SLA) informed the court that manufacturing licenses for 14 products of Patanjali Ayurved Ltd and Divya Pharmacy have been suspended immediately. The Supreme Court noted that the counsel representing the firm had requested time to submit an affidavit detailing the actions taken to retract the advertisements of Patanjali products and to recall the medicines.

Highlighting the importance of public awareness and responsible influence, the court emphasized that Baba Ramdev wields significant influence and should employ it responsibly. It awaits an affidavit from Patanjali outlining the measures implemented to withdraw the existing misleading advertisements of the company’s products, with instructions for submission within three weeks.

During the proceedings, Indian Medical Association (IMA) President R V Asokan extended an unconditional apology to the bench for remarks made against the top court in a recent interview with news agency PTI. Justice Kohli conveyed to Asokan that public figures cannot criticize the court in media interviews. However, the court indicated its disinclination to accept the apology affidavit submitted by the IMA president at present. In an earlier hearing on May 7, the apex court had denounced Asokan’s statements as “very, very unacceptable.” The court reiterated its stance that celebrities and social media influencers are equally liable for the products they endorse, warning that if such products are found to be misleading, they could face repercussions.

The case stems from a plea filed in 2022 by the IMA alleging a smear campaign by Patanjali against the Covid-19 vaccination drive and modern medical systems. As the legal proceedings unfold, the Supreme Court continues to emphasize the importance of accountability and responsible conduct in advertising and public discourse. The case underscores the need for stringent regulations to curb misleading advertisements and ensure consumer protection. With the demand for transparency and ethical practices on the rise, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in upholding standards of integrity in commercial communications.

As the court awaits the submission of the affidavit from Patanjali, stakeholders across industries are keenly observing the developments, anticipating their implications on advertising practices and regulatory enforcement in the country.

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Tech

Australia fights Musk’s platform over control of online content

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In a courtroom battle that underscores the complex interplay between global tech giants and national regulatory frameworks, Elon Musk’s X, formerly known as Twitter, finds itself at odds with Australian law over the removal of graphic content depicting a terrorist attack.

At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question: to what extent should a platform like X be compelled to adhere to the laws of a specific country when it comes to content moderation? The legal showdown commenced as the eSafety Commissioner of Australia sought the removal of 65 posts showcasing a harrowing video of an Assyrian Christian bishop being stabbed during a sermon in Sydney, classified as a terrorist incident by authorities.

Tim Begbie, representing the cyber regulator, argued that while X has policies in place to remove harmful content, it cannot claim unilateral authority to decide what is acceptable under Australian law. He contended that X’s resistance to globally removing the posts challenges the notion of reasonableness within the scope of Australia’s Online Safety Act.

X’s stance, guided by its mission to uphold free speech, underscores a broader philosophical debate surrounding the jurisdictional reach of national laws in the digital realm. The company maintains that while it has blocked access to the posts for Australian users, it refuses to implement global removal, asserting that the internet should not be governed by the laws of a single nation.

However, Begbie argued that geo-blocking, the solution proposed by X, is ineffective due to the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs) by a significant portion of the Australian population.

Amidst the legal wrangling, X’s lawyer, Bret Walker, contended that the company had taken reasonable steps to comply with Australian laws while balancing the principles of free expression. He emphasized the importance of allowing global access to newsworthy content, cautioning against the suppression of information on a global scale. The implications of such an approach, he argued, extend beyond Australia’s borders, potentially setting a precedent for censorship on a global scale.

As the case unfolds in the Federal Court, Judge Geoffrey Kennett has issued a temporary takedown order for the posts, extending it until June 10 pending a final decision. The outcome of this legal battle is poised to have far-reaching implications, not only for the regulation of online content in Australia but also for the broader discourse surrounding internet governance and free speech in the digital age.

Beyond the legal arguments, the case underscores the evolving dynamics between tech platforms and regulatory authorities, highlighting the challenges of reconciling competing interests in an increasingly interconnected world. With the proliferation of digital platforms and the rise of social media, questions surrounding content moderation, censorship, and the balance between freedom of expression and societal harm have come to the forefront of public discourse.

In the digital era, where information knows no borders and online platforms wield immense influence over public discourse, the case of X versus Australian law serves as a microcosm of the broader tensions between technology, governance, and individual rights. As societies grapple with the complexities of the digital age, the need for robust legal frameworks, ethical guidelines, and international cooperation becomes ever more apparent.

As the legal battle between X and Australian authorities unfolds, it underscores the intricate relationship between technology, law, and societal norms in the digital age. At stake is not just the removal of graphic content depicting a heinous act but also the broader principles of free speech, censorship, and the jurisdictional reach of national regulations in a globalized world.

The outcome of this case carries significant implications for the future of online content moderation and regulation. On one hand, proponents of free speech argue that platforms like X should have the autonomy to determine their content policies without being unduly influenced by the laws of individual countries. They contend that a global approach to content moderation ensures consistency and prevents the fragmentation of the internet along national lines.

On the other hand, proponents of regulation argue that national laws play a crucial role in safeguarding citizens from harmful content and upholding community standards. They assert that while platforms may operate globally, they must abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate, particularly when it comes to content that poses a threat to public safety or incites violence.

Amidst these competing interests, the case highlights the need for a nuanced approach to content moderation that balances the principles of free speech with the protection of users from harm. It also underscores the importance of international cooperation and dialogue in addressing cross-border challenges in the digital realm.

Beyond the legal realm, the case has broader implications for the future of internet governance and the regulation of online platforms. As technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace, policymakers around the world face the daunting task of crafting regulations that are effective, enforceable, and adaptable to the ever-changing digital landscape.

Moreover, the case raises important questions about the role of tech companies in shaping public discourse and influencing democratic processes. With social media platforms serving as key channels for information dissemination and political engagement, the decisions made by companies like X have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of democratic societies.

Ultimately, the resolution of this case will have significant implications not only for X and its users but also for the broader digital ecosystem. It will shape the future trajectory of online content moderation, influence regulatory approaches to technology platforms, and set precedents for how governments and tech companies interact in the digital age.

As the legal proceedings continue, stakeholders from across sectors will closely monitor developments, recognizing that the outcome of this case has the potential to reshape the digital landscape for years to come. Whether it leads to greater clarity in content moderation policies, a re-evaluation of regulatory frameworks, or a deeper understanding of the complexities of governing the internet, the case of X versus Australian law represents a pivotal moment in the ongoing debate over the future of online governance and free speech in the digital age.

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Supreme Court Framed Issues To Consider, Hearing In July 2024: Challenge To Surrogacy Law

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court in the case Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India has elucidated the issues it will consider in a batch of petitions challenging provisions of the Surrogacy Regulation Act, 2021 and the Surrogacy Regulation Rules, 2022. The bench comprising of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice AG Masih passed the order recording the following issues:

  1. Whether the prohibition of commercial surrogacy as stated under Section 4(ii)(b) and Section 4(ii)(c) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 is constitutional?
  2. Whether the right of a couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to married couples between the age of 23 to 50 years and in case of female and between 26 to 55 years in case of male as it is being provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, is constitutional?
  3. Whether the right of a single woman to avail surrogacy being restricted to only widows or divorcees between the ages of 35 to 45 years as it is provided being under Section 2(1)(s) of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act 2021, is constitutional?
  4. Whether the right of an intending couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to only those couples who do not have a surviving child as provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(II) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021, is constitutional?
  5. Whether individuals who initiated the process of availing surrogacy which being prior to the enactment of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act, 2021 have any right to avail surrogacy in a manner which being beyond the scope of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, save for cases falling within the ambit of Section 53 of the Act?

The petitioner in the plea highlighted an additional issue which relates to exclusion of single men from the purview of Surrogacy Regulation Act.

Therefore, the lead petition in the matter has been filed by an infertility specialist from Chennai, Dr. Arun Muthuvel, through Advocate Mohini Priya and Advocate Ameyavikrama Thanvi.

Therefore, while highlighting various contradictions in the Surrogacy Regulation Act and the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, thus, the petitioner in the plea points out that the twin legislations inaugurated a legal regime that was discriminatory and was violative of the constitutional rights of privacy and reproductive autonomy.

The Supreme Court in the case observed and has agreed to hear the petition wherein it challenges against the two Acts. In September last year, several other petitions and applications were filed wherein similar questions were raised, such as whether it was constitutional to exclude unmarried women from the ambit of the Surrogacy Act, or whether limiting the number of donations made by an oocyte donor under the ART Act would amount to unscientific and irrational restrictions.

The bench in the case observed and has expressed reservations about hearing the challenges to both the Acts simultaneously, as the linkage between the provisions of the two Acts could not be ascertained in the present matter. Further, the said court decided that issues wrt the Surrogacy Regulation Act will be heard first, followed by those which relate to the ART Act.

The court asked the parties to file written submissions on the foregoing issues. It has also been clarified by the said court that the petitioners need not restrict their submissions to the issues recorded by the court. Any ‘related’ issue may also be raised during the proceedings.

Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on July 30, 2024.

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Legally Speaking

SC ruling on spectrum allocation doesn’t affect satellites

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the government’s application seeking clarification on administrative allocation of spectrum for non-mobile services is not expected to impact the allocation of satellite spectrum as outlined in the Telecom Bill, according to highly placed sources. In February 2012, the Supreme Court had upheld that auctions were the preferred method for allocating scarce public resources like telecom spectrum.

The Centre had filed a miscellaneous application in December last year seeking a clarification on the matter of administrative allocation of spectrum, which was mentioned in court last week. However, the SC registrar refused to accept the plea, arguing that it was seeking a review of the 2012 order and that there was no ‘reasonable cause’ to entertain it.

Government sources emphasized that this decision would not change the existing laws governing spectrum allocations for satellite communications, as clearly stated in the Telecom Bill. Sources clarified that the application did not seek to amend the 2012 judgment on 2G spectrum allotment nor did it seek permission for administratively allocating spectrum. Spectrum will continue to be auctioned for mobile services, while for the 19 specific use cases cited in the Telecom Bill, it will be allocated administratively.

The government had filed the miscellaneous application at the Supreme Court to explain its intentions before tabling the bill in Parliament, emphasizing that it was not seeking any permission from the court. The application aimed to seek appropriate clarifications from the court regarding the CPIL judgment in 2012, to establish a spectrum assignment framework that includes methods of assignment other than auction in suitable cases, to best serve the common good. In 2012, the SC had criticized the ‘first-come, first served’ method for spectrum allocation, known as the CPIL judgment, and had quashed the 2G spectrum allotted by the United Progressive Alliance government.

Since then, the government has been issuing spectrum administratively in certain cases where auctions are not technically or economically preferred or optimal. The Telecom Bill’s First Schedule lists satellite spectrum and 18 other sectors where administrative allocations will be compulsory, including law enforcement, public broadcasting, in-flight and maritime connectivity, the Indian Army and Coast Guard, and radio backhaul for telecom services. Government sources noted that all stakeholders were consulted on the issue, and the government was confident of its legal standing as outlined in the Telecommunications Act.

The SC, in a presidential reference, did not specify that all spectrum should be auctioned, only that for mobile services. The Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the government’s application seeking clarification on spectrum allocation for non-mobile services does not alter the framework outlined in the Telecom Bill. While auctions remain the preferred method for mobile services, administrative allocations will continue for specific use cases, including satellite spectrum, as delineated in the bill.

The rejection of the application underscores the importance of adherence to established legal procedures and the judiciary’s role in upholding regulatory frameworks. Moving forward, the government remains committed to transparent and efficient spectrum allocation, balancing the imperatives of economic efficiency and public interest in the telecommunications sector.

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Legal Victory for Ankiti Bose: Limits Imposed on Defamatory Content Regarding Former Zilingo Chief

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A legal dispute has unfolded involving B2B fashion startup Zilingo, with former CEO Ankiti Bose on one side, and co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya on the opposing side.

A recent court decision in Delhi has brought focus to a legal dispute involving Ankiti Bose, the former CEO of Zilingo, a prominent technology platform. The court issued an ex parte order in Bose’s favor, instructing certain parties, including Zilingo co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya, to refrain from making defamatory statements against Bose. This decision underscores the importance of protecting reputational rights against unfair reporting.

The court’s ruling cited a prima facie case in Bose’s favor, acknowledging her legal right to safeguard her reputation from damaging remarks. It emphasized that failure to act promptly could lead to irreparable harm to Bose’s reputation. The order specifically bars Kapoor and Vaidya from making any further defamatory postings against the former CEO.

This legal action stems from a broader conflict within Zilingo, a B2B fashion startup that has faced financial struggles since its inception in 2015. Bose’s departure from the company was contentious, marked by allegations of misconduct and underperformance. She subsequently filed a First Information Report (FIR) accusing Kapoor and Vaidya of sexual harassment and business irregularities. In response, the accused have dismissed these claims as retaliatory, asserting that Bose’s actions were prompted by her dismissal from the company.

The litigation highlights the complexities of corporate disputes and the broader implications for individuals and businesses. Beyond the legalities, it reflects the challenges faced by startups navigating internal strife amidst financial difficulties. Zilingo’s trajectory, from inception to liquidation, encapsulates the turbulent landscape of the tech industry and underscores the importance of legal protections for individuals like Bose seeking to safeguard their professional standing amidst controversy. The court’s intervention serves as a reminder of the gravity of reputational issues in the modern corporate environment, particularly amidst the complexities of startup dynamics and leadership disputes.

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Supreme Court In Patanjali Case: Concerned With All FMCG/Drugs Companies Affecting Lives Of Children And Elderly Through Misleading Ads

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The Supreme Court in the case Indian Medical Association v. Union Of India observed and has clarified against Patanjali over publication of misleading advertisements that it was not dealing with Patanjali as a standalone entity; rather, the Court’s concern, in public interest, extended to all those Fast Moving Consumer Goods, FMCGs or drugs companies which take consumers of their products for a ride through misleading advertisements. The bench comprising of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah in its order stated that, this court must clarify that we are not here to gun for a particular party, or a particular agency or a particular authority.

This being the absolute Public Interest Litigation, PIL since it is in the larger interest of the consumers, the public to know which way they are going and how and why they can be misled and how […] is acting to prevent that misuse. Thus, at the end, this is also as we said a part of the process of rule of law. If that is violated, then it affects […].

The court in the case observed that the implementation of laws regulating misleading ads in relation to medicines require deeper examination, as the products are used for babies, school going children and senior citizens based on the ads: Further, the court stated that this court is of the opinion that the issue which relates to implementation of the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act and the Rules, the Drugs and Cosmetic Act and the Rules, and the Consumers Act and the relevant Rules needs closer examination in the light of the grievances raised by the petitioner…not just limited to the respondents before this court but to all similarly situated or placed FMCGs who have […] misleading advertisements, and taking the public for a ride…affecting the health of babies, school going children and senior citizens who have been consuming products on the basis of the said misrepresentation.

The court while taking into account the misleading ads issued in electronic media impleaded the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Information Technology, and Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Therefore, the same was being done with a view to examine the steps taken by these Ministries to prevent abuse of Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 1954 (and the Rules), the Drugs and Cosmetic Act 1940 (and Rules) and the Consumer Protection Act. Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on May 07, 2024.

Background Of The Case:

The Court raps Uttarakhand authorities The said court also came down heavily on the State of Uttarakhand for the failure of its licensing authorities to take legal action against Patanjali and its subsidiary Divya Pharmacy. The bench also asked why it should not think that the authorities were ‘hand in glove’ with Patanjali or Divya Pharmacy.

The court in its order stated that it was ‘appalled’ to note that apart from ‘pushing the file’, the State Licensing Authorities did nothing and were merely trying to ‘pass on the buck’ to ‘somehow delay the matter.’ The court stated that the State Licensing Authority is “equally complicit” due to its inaction against Divya Pharmacy despite having information about t heir advertisements violating the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act.

Further, the court stated that it was refraining from issuing contempt notices to other officers. Further, the court directed that all officers holding the post of Joint Director of the State Licensing Authority, Haridwar between 2018 till date shall also file affidavits explaining inaction on their part.

Background of the Case:

The contempt case was initiated wherein the petition is filed by the Indian Medical Association against Patanjali’s advertisements attacking allopathy and making claims about curing certain diseases. On the Supreme Court reprimand, the Patanjali on last November had assured that it would refrain from such advertisements. The court in the case noted that the misleading advertisements continued, thus, the Court had issued contempt notice to Patanjali and its MD in February.

The court in march considering that reply to the contempt notice was not filed, the personal appearance of the Patanjali MD as well as Baba Ramdev, who featured in the press conferences and advertisements published after the undertaking, was ordered by the said Court. Therefore, the Patanjali MD filed an affidavit wherein it is stated that the impugned advertisements were meant to contain only general statements but inadvertently included offending sentences. Further, the court stated that the advertisements were bona-fide and that Patanjali’s media personnel was not ‘cognizant’ of the November order (wherein the undertaking was given before the Supreme Court).

The affidavit filed also contained an averment that the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act was in an “archaic state” as it was enacted at a time when scientific evidence regarding Ayurvedic medicines was lacking. On the last date of hearing, both Baba Ramdev and MD Balkrishna were physically present in Court. The court expressed its reservations about MD Balkrishna’s affidavit, calling it “perfunctory” and “mere lip service”. The court gave last opportunity to the alleged contemnors for filing a proper affidavit.

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