Long standing domestic dispute constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ to spouse who intends to live in peace: MP HC - Business Guardian
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Long standing domestic dispute constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ to spouse who intends to live in peace: MP HC

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While dissolving a marriage on an appeal that was filed by the husband alleging cruelty at the hands of his wife, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a recent, remarkable, refreshing, robust and rational judgment titled Rajesh Bhoyale vs Smt Mahadevi in First Appeal No. 1172/2019 that was delivered finally on March 29, 2022, observed clearly, cogently and convincingly that a long-standing dispute itself is mental cruelty to a party who intends to live in a domestic relationship and peace. The Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Anand Pathak observed thus as it allowed the appeal filed by the appellant-husband against the judgment of the Family Court, Gwalior rejecting his application under Section 13 (1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 seeking a divorce. Very rightly so!

To start with, this learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment authored by Justice Anand Pathak for a Division Bench of Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court for himself and Justice Sheel Nagu sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The present appeal is preferred under Section 19 of the Family Court Act, 1984 against the judgment and decree dated 27-03- 2019 passed by the Link Family Court, Gwalior whereby the application preferred by the appellant/applicant/husband under Section 13(1)(iA) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) has been rejected.”

While elaborating the facts of the case, the Bench then states in para 2 that, “Precisely stated facts of the case are that marriage of appellant and respondent was solemnized on 22-02-2004 according to Hindu Rites and Rituals. After marriage, respondent/wife insisted to live separately and in order to maintain domestic peace, after 6 months of marriage, appellant and respondent started living separately. Despite living separately, respondent/wife used to quarrel with appellant and left for her maternal home without any information. She did not take any interest in household work. Out of their wedlock two children born but due to negligence on part of wife, one child died and only one survived. Respondent/wife used to talk on mobile for hours together and used to move with unknown persons during late night in city. Thus, domestic incompatibility prevailed between the parties which led to filing of application under Section 13 of the Act seeking divorce.”

It deserves mentioning that the Bench then notes in para 3 that, “One fact deserves mention is that respondent/wife did not appear in the trial Court and remained ex parte. That fact has been mentioned in para 5 of the judgment. Before this Court also, notice was issued for service of respondent through RAD mode earlier vide order dated 05-07-2019, but same returned unserved. Thereafter vide order dated 26-08-2019 process fee by RAD mode was directed to be given for service and same was received by the respondent but she did not prefer to appear, therefore, matter was heard in absence of respondent.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant at length and perusing the record as mentioned in para 4 then envisages in para 5 stating that, “In the instant case as per pleadings it appears that appellant filed application under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act with specific allegations that his marriage was solemnized on 22-02- 2004 at Gwalior and at relevant time appellant was living along with his parent but soon after his marriage, his wife compelled him to change his house and therefore, appellant has to part his ways with his parents and had to live with his wife in nuclear family for domestic peace. From their wedlock, two sons were born, out of which one was 14 years of age at the time of filing of application and another son passed away at the age of 3 years due to alleged negligence of respondent/wife.”

Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 6 that, “Submissions meandered through different allegations wherein neither she cooperated in performance of daily household work, taking care of children or in respect of maintaining domestic peace.”

Simply put, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “According to appellant, she used to converse on mobile for hours together and whenever intercepted, reacted sharply and indulged into verbal spat. Allegations further move in respect of her movement along with some unknown persons in the city but same has not been established by the appellant through cogent evidence. It was also the allegation of appellant that she does not cooperate in cohabitation with the appellant and she always avoided him.”

To be sure, the Bench then discloses in para 8 that, “Appellant referred certain mediation proceedings also pertaining to year 2009 to 2015 at Police Station Inderganj and from the pleadings and evidence it appears that reconciliation proceedings have been held but of no avail. Even in earlier case services of mediation center of this Court were also availed and settlement was struck on 01-12-2015 in case No.857/2015 but soon thereafter things turned ugly.”

Truth be told, the Bench then enunciates in para 9 that, “All these allegations as referred above are being narrated in the divorce application and affidavit filed under Order XVIII Rule 4 of CPC by the appellant. His examination-in-chief was also duly recorded by the Family Court but since the respondent did not appear and remained ex parte, therefore, those allegations were not rebutted in any manner because nobody rebutted and cross-examined the witness on behalf of respondent/wife. Beside oral evidence, appellant filed copy of complaint dated 29-04-2011 Ex-P/2 addressed to Station House Officer, Police Station Inderganj in which he referred about the conduct of his wife. In the said complaint, it is surfaced that wife is extending threat to the appellant regularly and at times she indulged into physical violence also, intimidating him for dire consequences as well as for false implication etc.”

As we see, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “Notice Ex-P/3 has also been exhibited by the appellant by which he issued legal notice on dated 08-10-2015 to his wife for seeking divorce, therefore, in all probabilities, respondent was well aware of the fact regarding domestic incompatibility shared by the couple and respondent knew the fact that appellant would file divorce proceedings against the respondent.”

As it turned out, the Bench then mentions in para 11 that, “Notice for mediation dated 15-10-2015 has also been exhibited by the appellant as Ex-P/5 in which he was directed to appear on 28-10-2015 at Mediation Center, High Court as pre-litigation mediation case. Appellant also referred the compromise deed Sulahnama (dated 01-12-2015) in which respondent was advised to live with her husband at Gwalior with further undertaking that she would not quarrel with her mother and father-in-law and if she goes to her maternal home on religious occasions then said arrangement shall be done by the appellant. It was also agreed upon that appellant would not have any objection if she talks on mobile to her parent.”

Of course, the Bench then states in para 12 that, “Vide Ex-P/7 appellant also exhibited the complaint sent to Station House Officer, Police Station, Inderganj and copy endorsed to Superintendent of Police on dated 15-05-2017. All these documents were exhibited by the appellant in support of his submission.”

Most damningly, the Bench then clearly states in para 13 that, “From perusal of these documents and allegations as contained in appeal, divorce application and affidavit, it appears that for a considerable period of time appellant and respondent shared domestic incompatibility and conduct of the respondent wherein she constantly for more than fifteen years or since 2004, caused irritation, threat, intimidation and avoiding cohabitation on the pretext or the other collectively entitled the appellant to get the decree of divorce.”

Furthermore, the Bench then states in para 14 that, “When appellant specifically pleaded about the behaviour of respondent for last more than 15 years and different stages of dispute, reconciliation and complaints from time to time were referred which indicate that both shared domestic incompatibility.”

While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then observes in para 15 that, “So far as mental cruelty is concerned judgment of Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, AIR 1975 SC 1534 is worth consideration. The relevant extract of the judgment is reproduced as under:

“The question whether the misconduct complained of constitutes cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is determined primarily by its effect upon the particular person complaining of the acts. The question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or a person of average or normal sensibilities, but whether it would have that effect upon the aggrieved spouse,. That which may be cruel to one person may be laughed off by another, and what may not be cruel to an individual under one set of circumstances may be extreme cruelty under another set of circumstances.”(1) The Court has to deal, not with an ideal husband and ideal wife (assuming any such exist) but with the particular man and woman before it. The ideal couple or a nearideal one will probably have no occasion to go to a matrimonial court for, even if they may not be able to drown their differences, their ideal attitudes may help them over- look or gloss over mutual faults and failures. As said by Lord Reid in his speech in Gollins v. Gollins (2) ALL ER 966

“In matrimonial cases we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman and the fewer a priori assumptions we make about them the better. In cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people.”

The said judgment still holds the field and is source of wisdom time and again in respect of mental cruelty.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then points out in para 16 that, “The aforesaid decision was referred to with approval in AIR 2002 SC 2582 (Praveen Mehta Vs. Inderjit Mehta), (2007) 4 SCC 511 {Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh}, (2010) 4 SCC 339 {Manisha Tyagi Vs. Deepak Kumar}, (2012) 7 SCC 288 {Vishwanath Agrawal Vs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal}, (2013) 2 SCC 114 {U. Sree Vs. U. Srinivas}. In all these cases, the judgment rendered in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane (supra) is relied upon. In the case of Samar Ghosh (supra), the Supreme Court has enumerated the illustrative instances of human behaviour which may be relevant for dealing with the cases of mental cruelty:

“No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of ‘mental cruelty’. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

(ii) ** ** **

(iii) ** ** **

(iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

(v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

(vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.

(vii) ** ** **

(viii) ** ** **

(ix) ** ** **

(x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

(xi) ** ** **

(xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.

(xiii) ** ** **

(xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.”

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then minces no words to state unequivocally in para 17 that, “It is equally well settled in law that lodging of false complaint amounts to cruelty {See: (2014) 7 SCC Malathi Vs. B.B. Ravi, (2013) 5 SCC 226 K. Shrinivas Rao Vs. D.A. Deepa, (2014) 16 SCC 34 K. Shrinivas Vs. Ku. Sunita and AIR 2003 MP 271 Johnson M. Joseph alias Shajoo Vs. Smt. Aneeta Johnson)}.”

It is worth noting that the Bench then remarks in para 18 that, “If the aforesaid pronouncements are tested on the anvil of present factual setup then it appears that for very long time parties shared domestic dispute and irritability and mental cruelty inflicted by the wife over her husband through her conduct and through her denial for cohabitation. In absence of any cross-examination or rebuttal, allegations of appellant assume importance.”

For sake of clarity, the Bench specifies in para 19 that, “Although maintenance amount/alimony is not subject matter in the present case but since respondent/wife is not before the Court, therefore, question of maintenance amount/alimony is left open and it is made clear that she may be at liberty to seek maintenance amount/alimony in accordance with law.”

Resultantly, the Bench then hastens to add in para 20 that, “Cumulatively, it appears that Family Court erred in rejecting the application for divorce preferred by the appellant whereas divorce decree ought to have been passed in the case. Long standing dispute itself is a mental cruelty to a party who intends to live in domestic relationship and peace.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 21 that, “Resultantly, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 27-03-2019 passed by the Link Family Court, Gwalior is set aside. Application under Section 13 of the Act stands allowed. Appellant is entitled to get divorce from his wife, respondent herein. Decree be drawn accordingly.”

In a nutshell, the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court comprising of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Anand Pathak who delivered this extremely commendable judgment have made it crystal clear that long standing domestic dispute constitutes ‘mental cruelty’ to spouse who intends to live in a domestic relationship and peace. So it is a good ground for obtaining divorce. Accordingly the divorce is granted thus to the appellant-husband by allowing his appeal which he had filed against the Family Court, Gwalior which had rejected his application under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 seeking a divorce. Very rightly so!

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court holds off on decision in Baba Ramdev contempt case

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The Supreme Court has deferred its decision on a contempt notice issued against yoga guru Ramdev, his associate Balkrishna, and their company Patanjali Ayurved in connection with a case involving misleading advertisements. The bench, comprising Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, stated, “Orders on the contempt notice issued to respondents 5 to 7 (Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, Balkrishna, and Ramdev) are reserved.” The Uttarakhand State Licensing Authority (SLA) informed the court that manufacturing licenses for 14 products of Patanjali Ayurved Ltd and Divya Pharmacy have been suspended immediately. The Supreme Court noted that the counsel representing the firm had requested time to submit an affidavit detailing the actions taken to retract the advertisements of Patanjali products and to recall the medicines.

Highlighting the importance of public awareness and responsible influence, the court emphasized that Baba Ramdev wields significant influence and should employ it responsibly. It awaits an affidavit from Patanjali outlining the measures implemented to withdraw the existing misleading advertisements of the company’s products, with instructions for submission within three weeks.

During the proceedings, Indian Medical Association (IMA) President R V Asokan extended an unconditional apology to the bench for remarks made against the top court in a recent interview with news agency PTI. Justice Kohli conveyed to Asokan that public figures cannot criticize the court in media interviews. However, the court indicated its disinclination to accept the apology affidavit submitted by the IMA president at present. In an earlier hearing on May 7, the apex court had denounced Asokan’s statements as “very, very unacceptable.” The court reiterated its stance that celebrities and social media influencers are equally liable for the products they endorse, warning that if such products are found to be misleading, they could face repercussions.

The case stems from a plea filed in 2022 by the IMA alleging a smear campaign by Patanjali against the Covid-19 vaccination drive and modern medical systems. As the legal proceedings unfold, the Supreme Court continues to emphasize the importance of accountability and responsible conduct in advertising and public discourse. The case underscores the need for stringent regulations to curb misleading advertisements and ensure consumer protection. With the demand for transparency and ethical practices on the rise, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in upholding standards of integrity in commercial communications.

As the court awaits the submission of the affidavit from Patanjali, stakeholders across industries are keenly observing the developments, anticipating their implications on advertising practices and regulatory enforcement in the country.

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Australia fights Musk’s platform over control of online content

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In a courtroom battle that underscores the complex interplay between global tech giants and national regulatory frameworks, Elon Musk’s X, formerly known as Twitter, finds itself at odds with Australian law over the removal of graphic content depicting a terrorist attack.

At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question: to what extent should a platform like X be compelled to adhere to the laws of a specific country when it comes to content moderation? The legal showdown commenced as the eSafety Commissioner of Australia sought the removal of 65 posts showcasing a harrowing video of an Assyrian Christian bishop being stabbed during a sermon in Sydney, classified as a terrorist incident by authorities.

Tim Begbie, representing the cyber regulator, argued that while X has policies in place to remove harmful content, it cannot claim unilateral authority to decide what is acceptable under Australian law. He contended that X’s resistance to globally removing the posts challenges the notion of reasonableness within the scope of Australia’s Online Safety Act.

X’s stance, guided by its mission to uphold free speech, underscores a broader philosophical debate surrounding the jurisdictional reach of national laws in the digital realm. The company maintains that while it has blocked access to the posts for Australian users, it refuses to implement global removal, asserting that the internet should not be governed by the laws of a single nation.

However, Begbie argued that geo-blocking, the solution proposed by X, is ineffective due to the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs) by a significant portion of the Australian population.

Amidst the legal wrangling, X’s lawyer, Bret Walker, contended that the company had taken reasonable steps to comply with Australian laws while balancing the principles of free expression. He emphasized the importance of allowing global access to newsworthy content, cautioning against the suppression of information on a global scale. The implications of such an approach, he argued, extend beyond Australia’s borders, potentially setting a precedent for censorship on a global scale.

As the case unfolds in the Federal Court, Judge Geoffrey Kennett has issued a temporary takedown order for the posts, extending it until June 10 pending a final decision. The outcome of this legal battle is poised to have far-reaching implications, not only for the regulation of online content in Australia but also for the broader discourse surrounding internet governance and free speech in the digital age.

Beyond the legal arguments, the case underscores the evolving dynamics between tech platforms and regulatory authorities, highlighting the challenges of reconciling competing interests in an increasingly interconnected world. With the proliferation of digital platforms and the rise of social media, questions surrounding content moderation, censorship, and the balance between freedom of expression and societal harm have come to the forefront of public discourse.

In the digital era, where information knows no borders and online platforms wield immense influence over public discourse, the case of X versus Australian law serves as a microcosm of the broader tensions between technology, governance, and individual rights. As societies grapple with the complexities of the digital age, the need for robust legal frameworks, ethical guidelines, and international cooperation becomes ever more apparent.

As the legal battle between X and Australian authorities unfolds, it underscores the intricate relationship between technology, law, and societal norms in the digital age. At stake is not just the removal of graphic content depicting a heinous act but also the broader principles of free speech, censorship, and the jurisdictional reach of national regulations in a globalized world.

The outcome of this case carries significant implications for the future of online content moderation and regulation. On one hand, proponents of free speech argue that platforms like X should have the autonomy to determine their content policies without being unduly influenced by the laws of individual countries. They contend that a global approach to content moderation ensures consistency and prevents the fragmentation of the internet along national lines.

On the other hand, proponents of regulation argue that national laws play a crucial role in safeguarding citizens from harmful content and upholding community standards. They assert that while platforms may operate globally, they must abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate, particularly when it comes to content that poses a threat to public safety or incites violence.

Amidst these competing interests, the case highlights the need for a nuanced approach to content moderation that balances the principles of free speech with the protection of users from harm. It also underscores the importance of international cooperation and dialogue in addressing cross-border challenges in the digital realm.

Beyond the legal realm, the case has broader implications for the future of internet governance and the regulation of online platforms. As technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace, policymakers around the world face the daunting task of crafting regulations that are effective, enforceable, and adaptable to the ever-changing digital landscape.

Moreover, the case raises important questions about the role of tech companies in shaping public discourse and influencing democratic processes. With social media platforms serving as key channels for information dissemination and political engagement, the decisions made by companies like X have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of democratic societies.

Ultimately, the resolution of this case will have significant implications not only for X and its users but also for the broader digital ecosystem. It will shape the future trajectory of online content moderation, influence regulatory approaches to technology platforms, and set precedents for how governments and tech companies interact in the digital age.

As the legal proceedings continue, stakeholders from across sectors will closely monitor developments, recognizing that the outcome of this case has the potential to reshape the digital landscape for years to come. Whether it leads to greater clarity in content moderation policies, a re-evaluation of regulatory frameworks, or a deeper understanding of the complexities of governing the internet, the case of X versus Australian law represents a pivotal moment in the ongoing debate over the future of online governance and free speech in the digital age.

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court Framed Issues To Consider, Hearing In July 2024: Challenge To Surrogacy Law

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court in the case Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India has elucidated the issues it will consider in a batch of petitions challenging provisions of the Surrogacy Regulation Act, 2021 and the Surrogacy Regulation Rules, 2022. The bench comprising of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice AG Masih passed the order recording the following issues:

  1. Whether the prohibition of commercial surrogacy as stated under Section 4(ii)(b) and Section 4(ii)(c) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 is constitutional?
  2. Whether the right of a couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to married couples between the age of 23 to 50 years and in case of female and between 26 to 55 years in case of male as it is being provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, is constitutional?
  3. Whether the right of a single woman to avail surrogacy being restricted to only widows or divorcees between the ages of 35 to 45 years as it is provided being under Section 2(1)(s) of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act 2021, is constitutional?
  4. Whether the right of an intending couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to only those couples who do not have a surviving child as provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(II) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021, is constitutional?
  5. Whether individuals who initiated the process of availing surrogacy which being prior to the enactment of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act, 2021 have any right to avail surrogacy in a manner which being beyond the scope of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, save for cases falling within the ambit of Section 53 of the Act?

The petitioner in the plea highlighted an additional issue which relates to exclusion of single men from the purview of Surrogacy Regulation Act.

Therefore, the lead petition in the matter has been filed by an infertility specialist from Chennai, Dr. Arun Muthuvel, through Advocate Mohini Priya and Advocate Ameyavikrama Thanvi.

Therefore, while highlighting various contradictions in the Surrogacy Regulation Act and the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, thus, the petitioner in the plea points out that the twin legislations inaugurated a legal regime that was discriminatory and was violative of the constitutional rights of privacy and reproductive autonomy.

The Supreme Court in the case observed and has agreed to hear the petition wherein it challenges against the two Acts. In September last year, several other petitions and applications were filed wherein similar questions were raised, such as whether it was constitutional to exclude unmarried women from the ambit of the Surrogacy Act, or whether limiting the number of donations made by an oocyte donor under the ART Act would amount to unscientific and irrational restrictions.

The bench in the case observed and has expressed reservations about hearing the challenges to both the Acts simultaneously, as the linkage between the provisions of the two Acts could not be ascertained in the present matter. Further, the said court decided that issues wrt the Surrogacy Regulation Act will be heard first, followed by those which relate to the ART Act.

The court asked the parties to file written submissions on the foregoing issues. It has also been clarified by the said court that the petitioners need not restrict their submissions to the issues recorded by the court. Any ‘related’ issue may also be raised during the proceedings.

Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on July 30, 2024.

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Legally Speaking

SC ruling on spectrum allocation doesn’t affect satellites

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the government’s application seeking clarification on administrative allocation of spectrum for non-mobile services is not expected to impact the allocation of satellite spectrum as outlined in the Telecom Bill, according to highly placed sources. In February 2012, the Supreme Court had upheld that auctions were the preferred method for allocating scarce public resources like telecom spectrum.

The Centre had filed a miscellaneous application in December last year seeking a clarification on the matter of administrative allocation of spectrum, which was mentioned in court last week. However, the SC registrar refused to accept the plea, arguing that it was seeking a review of the 2012 order and that there was no ‘reasonable cause’ to entertain it.

Government sources emphasized that this decision would not change the existing laws governing spectrum allocations for satellite communications, as clearly stated in the Telecom Bill. Sources clarified that the application did not seek to amend the 2012 judgment on 2G spectrum allotment nor did it seek permission for administratively allocating spectrum. Spectrum will continue to be auctioned for mobile services, while for the 19 specific use cases cited in the Telecom Bill, it will be allocated administratively.

The government had filed the miscellaneous application at the Supreme Court to explain its intentions before tabling the bill in Parliament, emphasizing that it was not seeking any permission from the court. The application aimed to seek appropriate clarifications from the court regarding the CPIL judgment in 2012, to establish a spectrum assignment framework that includes methods of assignment other than auction in suitable cases, to best serve the common good. In 2012, the SC had criticized the ‘first-come, first served’ method for spectrum allocation, known as the CPIL judgment, and had quashed the 2G spectrum allotted by the United Progressive Alliance government.

Since then, the government has been issuing spectrum administratively in certain cases where auctions are not technically or economically preferred or optimal. The Telecom Bill’s First Schedule lists satellite spectrum and 18 other sectors where administrative allocations will be compulsory, including law enforcement, public broadcasting, in-flight and maritime connectivity, the Indian Army and Coast Guard, and radio backhaul for telecom services. Government sources noted that all stakeholders were consulted on the issue, and the government was confident of its legal standing as outlined in the Telecommunications Act.

The SC, in a presidential reference, did not specify that all spectrum should be auctioned, only that for mobile services. The Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the government’s application seeking clarification on spectrum allocation for non-mobile services does not alter the framework outlined in the Telecom Bill. While auctions remain the preferred method for mobile services, administrative allocations will continue for specific use cases, including satellite spectrum, as delineated in the bill.

The rejection of the application underscores the importance of adherence to established legal procedures and the judiciary’s role in upholding regulatory frameworks. Moving forward, the government remains committed to transparent and efficient spectrum allocation, balancing the imperatives of economic efficiency and public interest in the telecommunications sector.

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Legal Victory for Ankiti Bose: Limits Imposed on Defamatory Content Regarding Former Zilingo Chief

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A legal dispute has unfolded involving B2B fashion startup Zilingo, with former CEO Ankiti Bose on one side, and co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya on the opposing side.

A recent court decision in Delhi has brought focus to a legal dispute involving Ankiti Bose, the former CEO of Zilingo, a prominent technology platform. The court issued an ex parte order in Bose’s favor, instructing certain parties, including Zilingo co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya, to refrain from making defamatory statements against Bose. This decision underscores the importance of protecting reputational rights against unfair reporting.

The court’s ruling cited a prima facie case in Bose’s favor, acknowledging her legal right to safeguard her reputation from damaging remarks. It emphasized that failure to act promptly could lead to irreparable harm to Bose’s reputation. The order specifically bars Kapoor and Vaidya from making any further defamatory postings against the former CEO.

This legal action stems from a broader conflict within Zilingo, a B2B fashion startup that has faced financial struggles since its inception in 2015. Bose’s departure from the company was contentious, marked by allegations of misconduct and underperformance. She subsequently filed a First Information Report (FIR) accusing Kapoor and Vaidya of sexual harassment and business irregularities. In response, the accused have dismissed these claims as retaliatory, asserting that Bose’s actions were prompted by her dismissal from the company.

The litigation highlights the complexities of corporate disputes and the broader implications for individuals and businesses. Beyond the legalities, it reflects the challenges faced by startups navigating internal strife amidst financial difficulties. Zilingo’s trajectory, from inception to liquidation, encapsulates the turbulent landscape of the tech industry and underscores the importance of legal protections for individuals like Bose seeking to safeguard their professional standing amidst controversy. The court’s intervention serves as a reminder of the gravity of reputational issues in the modern corporate environment, particularly amidst the complexities of startup dynamics and leadership disputes.

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Supreme Court In Patanjali Case: Concerned With All FMCG/Drugs Companies Affecting Lives Of Children And Elderly Through Misleading Ads

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The Supreme Court in the case Indian Medical Association v. Union Of India observed and has clarified against Patanjali over publication of misleading advertisements that it was not dealing with Patanjali as a standalone entity; rather, the Court’s concern, in public interest, extended to all those Fast Moving Consumer Goods, FMCGs or drugs companies which take consumers of their products for a ride through misleading advertisements. The bench comprising of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah in its order stated that, this court must clarify that we are not here to gun for a particular party, or a particular agency or a particular authority.

This being the absolute Public Interest Litigation, PIL since it is in the larger interest of the consumers, the public to know which way they are going and how and why they can be misled and how […] is acting to prevent that misuse. Thus, at the end, this is also as we said a part of the process of rule of law. If that is violated, then it affects […].

The court in the case observed that the implementation of laws regulating misleading ads in relation to medicines require deeper examination, as the products are used for babies, school going children and senior citizens based on the ads: Further, the court stated that this court is of the opinion that the issue which relates to implementation of the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act and the Rules, the Drugs and Cosmetic Act and the Rules, and the Consumers Act and the relevant Rules needs closer examination in the light of the grievances raised by the petitioner…not just limited to the respondents before this court but to all similarly situated or placed FMCGs who have […] misleading advertisements, and taking the public for a ride…affecting the health of babies, school going children and senior citizens who have been consuming products on the basis of the said misrepresentation.

The court while taking into account the misleading ads issued in electronic media impleaded the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Information Technology, and Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Therefore, the same was being done with a view to examine the steps taken by these Ministries to prevent abuse of Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 1954 (and the Rules), the Drugs and Cosmetic Act 1940 (and Rules) and the Consumer Protection Act. Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on May 07, 2024.

Background Of The Case:

The Court raps Uttarakhand authorities The said court also came down heavily on the State of Uttarakhand for the failure of its licensing authorities to take legal action against Patanjali and its subsidiary Divya Pharmacy. The bench also asked why it should not think that the authorities were ‘hand in glove’ with Patanjali or Divya Pharmacy.

The court in its order stated that it was ‘appalled’ to note that apart from ‘pushing the file’, the State Licensing Authorities did nothing and were merely trying to ‘pass on the buck’ to ‘somehow delay the matter.’ The court stated that the State Licensing Authority is “equally complicit” due to its inaction against Divya Pharmacy despite having information about t heir advertisements violating the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act.

Further, the court stated that it was refraining from issuing contempt notices to other officers. Further, the court directed that all officers holding the post of Joint Director of the State Licensing Authority, Haridwar between 2018 till date shall also file affidavits explaining inaction on their part.

Background of the Case:

The contempt case was initiated wherein the petition is filed by the Indian Medical Association against Patanjali’s advertisements attacking allopathy and making claims about curing certain diseases. On the Supreme Court reprimand, the Patanjali on last November had assured that it would refrain from such advertisements. The court in the case noted that the misleading advertisements continued, thus, the Court had issued contempt notice to Patanjali and its MD in February.

The court in march considering that reply to the contempt notice was not filed, the personal appearance of the Patanjali MD as well as Baba Ramdev, who featured in the press conferences and advertisements published after the undertaking, was ordered by the said Court. Therefore, the Patanjali MD filed an affidavit wherein it is stated that the impugned advertisements were meant to contain only general statements but inadvertently included offending sentences. Further, the court stated that the advertisements were bona-fide and that Patanjali’s media personnel was not ‘cognizant’ of the November order (wherein the undertaking was given before the Supreme Court).

The affidavit filed also contained an averment that the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act was in an “archaic state” as it was enacted at a time when scientific evidence regarding Ayurvedic medicines was lacking. On the last date of hearing, both Baba Ramdev and MD Balkrishna were physically present in Court. The court expressed its reservations about MD Balkrishna’s affidavit, calling it “perfunctory” and “mere lip service”. The court gave last opportunity to the alleged contemnors for filing a proper affidavit.

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