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Bombay High Court orders 7 days jail for prison superintendent for denying emergency parole to eligible prisoners

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In a very significant development with far reaching consequences, the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court in a recent, refreshing, robust, rational and remarkable judgment titled Hanuman Anandrao Pendam v State of Maharashtra in Criminal Writ Petition No. 537/2021 delivered as recently as on March 16, 2022 has held the Superintendent of Central Prison, Nagpur – Anupkumar M Kumre – guilty of contempt and sentenced him to seven days simple imprisonment for selectively denying prisoners emergency parole during the Covid pandemic. The Division Bench of Justice VM Deshpande and Justice Amit Borkar refused to accept Kumre’s apology, fined him Rs 5,000 and suspended the sentence for 10 weeks, allowing him to approach the Supreme Court for relief. The Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court observed that, “If the Court finds that the Government’s (officials) action in rejecting the grant of parole to a prisoner has the effect of suffocating the Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, in that case, the Court must act to restore the rule of law and respect the residuary fundamental rights of the prisoners.” Very rightly so!

To start with, this oral judgment authored by Justice Amit Borkar by a Bench of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court comprising of himself and Justice VM Deshpande sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 3 that, “This is a suo motu contempt initiated in exercise of the power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India against a Contemnor Shri Anupkumar M. Kumre, Superintendent of Central Prison, Nagpur, mainly on the grounds that the Contemnor selectively chose to apply the binding precedent of this Court as regards the release of prisoners in Central Prison, Nagpur on emergency parole in wilful disobedience of the judgment of this Court in the case of Milind Ashok Patil and Ors vs State of Maharashtra, in Criminal Writ Petition-ASDBLD-VC No.65/2020 thereby refusing to release 35 prisoners on emergency parole though eligible and granting emergency parole to 6 prisoners though ineligible. Furthermore, in addition to the aforesaid grounds, notice was issued for making misleading statements made in the affidavit filed before this Court, though cautioned twice earlier by two Co-ordinate Benches of this Court.”

While elaborating on the facts, the Bench then stipulates in para 4 that, “The facts which necessitated initiation of sou-motu contempt proceedings, which are relevant for adjudication of the present proceedings briefly are as under:-

The State of Maharashtra on 08/05/2020 introduced Rule 19(1)(c) in the Maharashtra Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) (Amendment) Rules, 2020 (for short “the said Rules”) providing for the grant of emergency parole in view of the emergent Corona pandemic. One of the prisoners, namely Hanuman Anandrao Pendam, filed this Writ Petition seeking directions against the Contemnor for his release on emergency parole. In pursuance of the notice, the Contemnor filed a reply stating that the Petitioner did not surrender on his own and was required to be arrested.”

As it turned out, the Bench then discloses in para 5 that, “On 03/08/2021, this Court issued notice to the Contemnor and others, pursuance of which the Contemnor filed affidavit-in-reply on 11/08/2021 justifying the rejection of the emergency parole leave of the Petitioner stating that he was absconding for 14 days after expiry of the period of furlough leave of 21 days. However, curiously, the Contemnor filed another affidavit dated 14/09/2021, taking a U-turn and stating that the Petitioner had reported on time on 16/02/2021. However, the Petitioner was directed to go to the Government Hospital for undergoing a Covid test.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 6 that, “On 27/09/2021, when this Court was about to dismiss the present Petition, the Advocate for Petitioner submitted that the Contemnor had released similar prisoners on parole though they were ineligible, but she was not having copies of such orders. She placed on record one such copy of the order. We, therefore, appointed Mr. F.T. Mirza as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court, as the Advocate appearing for Petitioner is a new entrant in the Bar. We also directed the Contemnor to file his personal affidavit giving all the details in respect of the orders passed after the policy of emergency Corona parole was introduced in a tabular form giving the details of prisoners/convicts who were released on emergency parole though surrendered late on their own as well as those brought in jail be using Police machinery and entire data in respect of the cases where he had released prisoners and rejected emergency parole under the Rules.”

Furthermore, the Bench then discloses in para 7 that, “In pursuance of the said order, the Contemnor filed his affidavit dated 28/09/2021, wherein he stated that 90 prisoners were denied emergency parole as they were found ineligible as per the Rules. The Contemnor, along with the said affidavit, filed five lists which are as under:-

i) List of 292 prisoners who were granted parole;

(ii) List of six prisoners who reported late;

(iii) List of six prisoners who surrendered on their own and were released on parole;

(iv) List of 63 prisoners released on parole; and

(v) List of 90 prisoners who were refused parole.”

As things stand, the Bench then points out in para 8 that, “At this stage, it needs to be noted that Prisoner Suresh Bhoyer’s name is mentioned in the two lists. One list shows that he reported late by seven days and another list shows that he reported on time.”

Notably, the Bench then remarks in para 9 that, “On 30/09/2021 learned Amicus Curiae invited the attention of this Court to various judgments (unreported) of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and in particular the order passed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1069/2020 wherein the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court noted the manner in which the Prison Authorities flout the orders of this Court. Therefore, we directed the Respondent No. 2 to give details of the following facts on oath.

“i. The names of prisoners who were released on emergency parole under Rules though they were not released earlier twice;

ii. The names of prisoners who were denied emergency parole under Rules on the ground that they are residents of other States;

iii. The names of prisoners who were granted emergency parole though residents of other states.

iv. The names of prisoners who were released on emergency parole and after the expiry of the period of 45 days, their parole leave was not automatically extended;

v. The names of prisoners who were released on emergency parole under Rules and after the expiry of 45 days period their parole leave was automatically extended;

vi. The number of applications that were pending for more than one month where the prisoners had sought their release on emergency parole;”

It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then notes in para 10 that, “This Court, after comparing the anomalies in the affidavit, by the order dated 04/10/2021, directed the Contemnor to file an affidavit as to why different treatment is given to different prisoners though they were similarly situated. For the sake of clarity, Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the order dated 04/10/2021 are reproduced herein under:-

“1. In pursuance of order dated 30/09/2021, the respondent No.2 has filed his affidavit dated 01/10/2021 giving list of prisoners, as directed in the said order. Annexure – I of the said affidavit give list of the prisoners, who were released under Rule 19(1)(c) of the Prison Rules, 1959, though they were not released earlier twice. It needs to be noted that in an affidavit dated 20/09/2021, the respondent No.2 by way of Annexure R-7 has given a list of the prisoners whose parole leave had been rejected under Rule 19(1)(c) of the Prison Rules, 1959 for the reason that they were not released earlier on two occasions. The comparison between the affidavits on the face of it shows that the respondent No.2 has released many prisoners but on the same ground has refused parole leave to others during the same period. It is therefore, necessary for the respondent No.2 to explain, prima facie, arbitrary exercise of power.

3. The respondent No.2 shall file his detailed affidavit which shall include explanation / reasons as to why different treatment is given to different prisoners though all were similarly situated. The respondent No.2 shall explain in detail his explanation in relation to any other matter which he things relevant for adjudication of the present petition.””

As we see, the Bench then reveals in para 11 that, “In compliance with the order dated 04/10/2021, the Contemnor filed another affidavit on 06/10/2021 justifying his stand. In Paragraph 5 of the said affidavit, the Contemnor has stated on oath that he had carefully gone through the lists prepared by his office. Further, in Paragraph 1 of the said affidavit, he stated that he had carefully gone through the orders passed by this Court dated 30/09/2021 and 04/10/2021. He had also verified the position available on record in his office.”

Quite significantly, the Bench then observes in para 12 that, “Not being satisfied by the explanation offered by the Contemnor, this Court, on 08/10/2021, issued a notice of suo motu contempt under Rule 9(1) of the Contempt of the Courts (Bombay High Court) Rules, 1994 to Shri Anupkumar M. Kumre. This Court, in the order dated 08/10/2021, gave the detailed reasons as to why prima-facie action for Contempt of Court needs to be taken against the Contemnor. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had warned the Contemnor from giving false information or misleading the Court while filing his affidavit. For the sake of convenience, Paragraphs 7 & 8 of the order dated 08/10/2021 read as under:-

“7. The first instance of the indicator of the arbitrariness of respondent no.2 was noted by this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 524/2020 in order dated 25th November 2020. (Coram: Sunil B. Shukre and Avinash G. Gharote JJ.) wherein this Court in Para no.11 has observed thus :

“The respondent no. 2 is requested to be cautious in performing of his duty and refrain from any attempt from giving false information to the Court or misleading the Court while filing his reply on affidavit in future.”

8. The second instance is the order passed by this Court in Civil Application No. 188/2021 in Contempt Petition No.56/2021 wherein this Court by order dated 26th February,2021 (Croam: Z.A. Haq and Amit B Borkar, JJ.) by taking a suo moto cognisance of refusal on the part of respondent no.2 to release of a prisoner on bail in spite of specific order passed by the Court. The Court observed in para no.7 that the tenor of the respondent’s explanation shows that he had utterly brushed aside the directions given by the Court to release the accused therein who has overlooked the issue of personal liberty of the accused. Then Court observed that respondent no.2 could not sit in appeal over the directions given by the competent Court. If such action is tolerated, there will not be any meaning to the principle of the rule of law which is the foundation of an institution functioning in a democratic set up. That time, Court noted in earlier order referred to hereinabove and observed that the second respondent had repeated the mistake within a span of ten weeks. Though Court accepted the unconditional apology tendered by the respondent Court was of the view that the entry about the said order should be taken in the service book of respondent no.2, so that officer of such high rank does not commit such a blunder.

Accordingly, we are informed that an entry in the service book of the respondent no.2 was taken, and this Court was communicated with the said fact by way of an affidavit.”

Without mincing any words, the Bench then holds in para 79 that, “On an overall view of the precedent relied upon by the Contemnor and the learned Amicus Curiae, we are satisfied that this Court should not extend the mercy of discharging the Contemnor by accepting his apology as it would amount to encouraging his behaviour of selectively applying binding precedent of this Court. This is not the solitary instance, but earlier Co-ordinate Benches of this Court have cautioned the Contemnor by observing not to indulge in misleading the Court. In spite of such caution, it appears that the Contemnor has filed affidavits before this Court making false statements and giving incorrect information on several occasions, which we have noted earlier. At the cost of repetition, we must mention that on the earlier date of hearing, the Advocate for the Contemnor was made aware of the consequences of the statement made in an affidavit dated 08/03/2022 wherein the Contemnor had feigned ignorance to the judgment of this Court. During the course of the hearing, the Advocate was allowed to go out of the Courtroom to make Contemnor aware of the consequences of making a false statement in an affidavit. In spite of granting sufficient time, the Contemnor persisted with his defence of being not aware of the judgment of this Court in the case of Milind Ashok Patil, which we have found to be false in view of the documents on record. The conduct for which the apology has been tendered cannot be ignored without compromising the dignity of the Court. We, therefore, hold the Contemnor guilty of wilful disobedience of the judgment of this Court in the case of Milind Ashok Patil.”

Most forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 81 that, “While awarding a sentence on the Contemnor, the Court does so to uphold the majesty of law and not with an idea of vindicating the prestige of the Court. It is really to see that the unflinching faith of people in Courts remains intact. This Court is conscious of the legal position that sentence of fine should be rule and imprisonment is an exception. In the facts of the present case where 35 poor prisoners were denied their residual fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, most of whom could not afford to challenge the denial of emergency parole. Per contra, six ineligible prisoners were released on emergency parole for reasons best known to him. In spite of caution by two Co-ordinate Benches not to mislead this Court by filing false affidavits, the Contemnor has pleaded false defence of lack of knowledge. The reply before Disciplinary Authority shows that the Contemnor has intentionally disobeyed binding precedent 41 times.”

To be sure, the Bench then maintains in para 82 that, “Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act provides that the maximum amount of fine may extend to two thousand rupees. It is well settled that the inherent power to punish for contempt is provided in Article 215 of the Constitution of India which states that every High Courts shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. This Constitutional power is an absolute power which cannot be abridged by any statutory law. This power contemplated by Article 215 of the Constitution of India cannot be abridged or controlled by any statute and so, no limitation as contemplated by Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 can be read in the exercise of that power. When the High Court exercises its powers derived from Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, could only be regarded as laying down the procedure to be followed.”

Most remarkably, the Bench then hastens to add in para 83 that, “Therefore, in facts of the present case, we are imposing a fine of Rupees Five Thousand in exercise of the power under Article 215 of Constitution of India deriving support from observations in the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Re: Vijay Kurle and Others reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 407 which is affirmed in Prashant Bhushan, In re (Contempt Matter),(2021) 1 SCC 745; Prashant Bhushan, In re (Contempt Matter),(2021) 3 SCC 160, wherein in Paragraph 36, it is observed as under,

“36. A careful analysis of the Constitution Bench decision leaves no manner of doubt that Section 15 of the Act is not a substantive provision conferring contempt jurisdiction. The Constitution Bench finally left the question of whether the maximum sentence prescribed by the Act binds the Supreme Court open. The observations made in Para 38 referred to above clearly indicate that the Constitution Bench was of the view that the punishment prescribed in the Act could only be a guideline and nothing more. Certain observations made in this judgment that the Court exceeded its jurisdiction in Vinay Chandra Mishra’s case (supra) by taking away the right of practice for a period of 3 years have to be read in the context that the Apex Court held that Article 129 could not take over the jurisdiction of the Bar Council of the State or the Bar Council of India to punish an advocate. These observations, in our opinion, have to be read with the other observations quoted hereinabove, which clearly show that the Constitution Bench held that “Parliament has not enacted any law dealing with the powers of the Supreme Court with regard to investigation and punishment of contempt of itself.” The Court also held that Section 15 is not a substantive provision conferring contempt jurisdiction. Therefore, it is only a procedural section, especially in so far as suo moto contempts are concerned. It is thus clear that the powers of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt committed of itself is a power not subject to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the only requirement is to follow a procedure that is just, fair and in accordance with the rules framed by this Court.”

Going ahead, the Bench then holds in para 84 that, “Therefore, we pass the following order:-

(a) The Contemnor Anupkumar Kumre is held guilty of committing wilful disobedience of the binding precedent of this Court in the case of Milind Ashok Patil.

(b) The Contemnor Anupkumar Kumre shall undergo simple imprisonment for seven days. In addition, the Contemnor shall pay a fine of Rs. Five Thousand, in default, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further seven days.

(c) At this stage, learned Advocate for the Contemnor prays for suspension of the sentence. Accordingly, considering the facts of the case, we suspend the sentence of imprisonment and fine for a period of 10 weeks.

(d) We express our gratitude for the valuable assistance rendered by learned Amicus Curiae Shri F.T. Mirza, Advocate.”

To summarize, the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court has taken a very strong exception to the Jail Superintendent’s despicable stand of selectively denying emergency parole to eligible prisoners during the Covid pandemic. This alone explains why the Court ordered 7 day jail term for him. It merits no reiteration that all those men in uniform who hold high position like that of Jail Superintendent as we see in this notable case then full care should be taken to ensure that no one is denied emergency parole who deserves it! It shall be in their own best interests! No doubt, all the courts must also definitely act similarly in similar such cases like the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court has done in this noteworthy case so that no men in uniform can ever dare to take the legal rights of prisoners for granted!

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court holds off on decision in Baba Ramdev contempt case

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The Supreme Court has deferred its decision on a contempt notice issued against yoga guru Ramdev, his associate Balkrishna, and their company Patanjali Ayurved in connection with a case involving misleading advertisements. The bench, comprising Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, stated, “Orders on the contempt notice issued to respondents 5 to 7 (Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, Balkrishna, and Ramdev) are reserved.” The Uttarakhand State Licensing Authority (SLA) informed the court that manufacturing licenses for 14 products of Patanjali Ayurved Ltd and Divya Pharmacy have been suspended immediately. The Supreme Court noted that the counsel representing the firm had requested time to submit an affidavit detailing the actions taken to retract the advertisements of Patanjali products and to recall the medicines.

Highlighting the importance of public awareness and responsible influence, the court emphasized that Baba Ramdev wields significant influence and should employ it responsibly. It awaits an affidavit from Patanjali outlining the measures implemented to withdraw the existing misleading advertisements of the company’s products, with instructions for submission within three weeks.

During the proceedings, Indian Medical Association (IMA) President R V Asokan extended an unconditional apology to the bench for remarks made against the top court in a recent interview with news agency PTI. Justice Kohli conveyed to Asokan that public figures cannot criticize the court in media interviews. However, the court indicated its disinclination to accept the apology affidavit submitted by the IMA president at present. In an earlier hearing on May 7, the apex court had denounced Asokan’s statements as “very, very unacceptable.” The court reiterated its stance that celebrities and social media influencers are equally liable for the products they endorse, warning that if such products are found to be misleading, they could face repercussions.

The case stems from a plea filed in 2022 by the IMA alleging a smear campaign by Patanjali against the Covid-19 vaccination drive and modern medical systems. As the legal proceedings unfold, the Supreme Court continues to emphasize the importance of accountability and responsible conduct in advertising and public discourse. The case underscores the need for stringent regulations to curb misleading advertisements and ensure consumer protection. With the demand for transparency and ethical practices on the rise, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in upholding standards of integrity in commercial communications.

As the court awaits the submission of the affidavit from Patanjali, stakeholders across industries are keenly observing the developments, anticipating their implications on advertising practices and regulatory enforcement in the country.

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Tech

Australia fights Musk’s platform over control of online content

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In a courtroom battle that underscores the complex interplay between global tech giants and national regulatory frameworks, Elon Musk’s X, formerly known as Twitter, finds itself at odds with Australian law over the removal of graphic content depicting a terrorist attack.

At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question: to what extent should a platform like X be compelled to adhere to the laws of a specific country when it comes to content moderation? The legal showdown commenced as the eSafety Commissioner of Australia sought the removal of 65 posts showcasing a harrowing video of an Assyrian Christian bishop being stabbed during a sermon in Sydney, classified as a terrorist incident by authorities.

Tim Begbie, representing the cyber regulator, argued that while X has policies in place to remove harmful content, it cannot claim unilateral authority to decide what is acceptable under Australian law. He contended that X’s resistance to globally removing the posts challenges the notion of reasonableness within the scope of Australia’s Online Safety Act.

X’s stance, guided by its mission to uphold free speech, underscores a broader philosophical debate surrounding the jurisdictional reach of national laws in the digital realm. The company maintains that while it has blocked access to the posts for Australian users, it refuses to implement global removal, asserting that the internet should not be governed by the laws of a single nation.

However, Begbie argued that geo-blocking, the solution proposed by X, is ineffective due to the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs) by a significant portion of the Australian population.

Amidst the legal wrangling, X’s lawyer, Bret Walker, contended that the company had taken reasonable steps to comply with Australian laws while balancing the principles of free expression. He emphasized the importance of allowing global access to newsworthy content, cautioning against the suppression of information on a global scale. The implications of such an approach, he argued, extend beyond Australia’s borders, potentially setting a precedent for censorship on a global scale.

As the case unfolds in the Federal Court, Judge Geoffrey Kennett has issued a temporary takedown order for the posts, extending it until June 10 pending a final decision. The outcome of this legal battle is poised to have far-reaching implications, not only for the regulation of online content in Australia but also for the broader discourse surrounding internet governance and free speech in the digital age.

Beyond the legal arguments, the case underscores the evolving dynamics between tech platforms and regulatory authorities, highlighting the challenges of reconciling competing interests in an increasingly interconnected world. With the proliferation of digital platforms and the rise of social media, questions surrounding content moderation, censorship, and the balance between freedom of expression and societal harm have come to the forefront of public discourse.

In the digital era, where information knows no borders and online platforms wield immense influence over public discourse, the case of X versus Australian law serves as a microcosm of the broader tensions between technology, governance, and individual rights. As societies grapple with the complexities of the digital age, the need for robust legal frameworks, ethical guidelines, and international cooperation becomes ever more apparent.

As the legal battle between X and Australian authorities unfolds, it underscores the intricate relationship between technology, law, and societal norms in the digital age. At stake is not just the removal of graphic content depicting a heinous act but also the broader principles of free speech, censorship, and the jurisdictional reach of national regulations in a globalized world.

The outcome of this case carries significant implications for the future of online content moderation and regulation. On one hand, proponents of free speech argue that platforms like X should have the autonomy to determine their content policies without being unduly influenced by the laws of individual countries. They contend that a global approach to content moderation ensures consistency and prevents the fragmentation of the internet along national lines.

On the other hand, proponents of regulation argue that national laws play a crucial role in safeguarding citizens from harmful content and upholding community standards. They assert that while platforms may operate globally, they must abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate, particularly when it comes to content that poses a threat to public safety or incites violence.

Amidst these competing interests, the case highlights the need for a nuanced approach to content moderation that balances the principles of free speech with the protection of users from harm. It also underscores the importance of international cooperation and dialogue in addressing cross-border challenges in the digital realm.

Beyond the legal realm, the case has broader implications for the future of internet governance and the regulation of online platforms. As technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace, policymakers around the world face the daunting task of crafting regulations that are effective, enforceable, and adaptable to the ever-changing digital landscape.

Moreover, the case raises important questions about the role of tech companies in shaping public discourse and influencing democratic processes. With social media platforms serving as key channels for information dissemination and political engagement, the decisions made by companies like X have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of democratic societies.

Ultimately, the resolution of this case will have significant implications not only for X and its users but also for the broader digital ecosystem. It will shape the future trajectory of online content moderation, influence regulatory approaches to technology platforms, and set precedents for how governments and tech companies interact in the digital age.

As the legal proceedings continue, stakeholders from across sectors will closely monitor developments, recognizing that the outcome of this case has the potential to reshape the digital landscape for years to come. Whether it leads to greater clarity in content moderation policies, a re-evaluation of regulatory frameworks, or a deeper understanding of the complexities of governing the internet, the case of X versus Australian law represents a pivotal moment in the ongoing debate over the future of online governance and free speech in the digital age.

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court Framed Issues To Consider, Hearing In July 2024: Challenge To Surrogacy Law

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court in the case Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India has elucidated the issues it will consider in a batch of petitions challenging provisions of the Surrogacy Regulation Act, 2021 and the Surrogacy Regulation Rules, 2022. The bench comprising of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice AG Masih passed the order recording the following issues:

  1. Whether the prohibition of commercial surrogacy as stated under Section 4(ii)(b) and Section 4(ii)(c) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 is constitutional?
  2. Whether the right of a couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to married couples between the age of 23 to 50 years and in case of female and between 26 to 55 years in case of male as it is being provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, is constitutional?
  3. Whether the right of a single woman to avail surrogacy being restricted to only widows or divorcees between the ages of 35 to 45 years as it is provided being under Section 2(1)(s) of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act 2021, is constitutional?
  4. Whether the right of an intending couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to only those couples who do not have a surviving child as provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(II) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021, is constitutional?
  5. Whether individuals who initiated the process of availing surrogacy which being prior to the enactment of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act, 2021 have any right to avail surrogacy in a manner which being beyond the scope of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, save for cases falling within the ambit of Section 53 of the Act?

The petitioner in the plea highlighted an additional issue which relates to exclusion of single men from the purview of Surrogacy Regulation Act.

Therefore, the lead petition in the matter has been filed by an infertility specialist from Chennai, Dr. Arun Muthuvel, through Advocate Mohini Priya and Advocate Ameyavikrama Thanvi.

Therefore, while highlighting various contradictions in the Surrogacy Regulation Act and the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, thus, the petitioner in the plea points out that the twin legislations inaugurated a legal regime that was discriminatory and was violative of the constitutional rights of privacy and reproductive autonomy.

The Supreme Court in the case observed and has agreed to hear the petition wherein it challenges against the two Acts. In September last year, several other petitions and applications were filed wherein similar questions were raised, such as whether it was constitutional to exclude unmarried women from the ambit of the Surrogacy Act, or whether limiting the number of donations made by an oocyte donor under the ART Act would amount to unscientific and irrational restrictions.

The bench in the case observed and has expressed reservations about hearing the challenges to both the Acts simultaneously, as the linkage between the provisions of the two Acts could not be ascertained in the present matter. Further, the said court decided that issues wrt the Surrogacy Regulation Act will be heard first, followed by those which relate to the ART Act.

The court asked the parties to file written submissions on the foregoing issues. It has also been clarified by the said court that the petitioners need not restrict their submissions to the issues recorded by the court. Any ‘related’ issue may also be raised during the proceedings.

Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on July 30, 2024.

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Legally Speaking

SC ruling on spectrum allocation doesn’t affect satellites

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the government’s application seeking clarification on administrative allocation of spectrum for non-mobile services is not expected to impact the allocation of satellite spectrum as outlined in the Telecom Bill, according to highly placed sources. In February 2012, the Supreme Court had upheld that auctions were the preferred method for allocating scarce public resources like telecom spectrum.

The Centre had filed a miscellaneous application in December last year seeking a clarification on the matter of administrative allocation of spectrum, which was mentioned in court last week. However, the SC registrar refused to accept the plea, arguing that it was seeking a review of the 2012 order and that there was no ‘reasonable cause’ to entertain it.

Government sources emphasized that this decision would not change the existing laws governing spectrum allocations for satellite communications, as clearly stated in the Telecom Bill. Sources clarified that the application did not seek to amend the 2012 judgment on 2G spectrum allotment nor did it seek permission for administratively allocating spectrum. Spectrum will continue to be auctioned for mobile services, while for the 19 specific use cases cited in the Telecom Bill, it will be allocated administratively.

The government had filed the miscellaneous application at the Supreme Court to explain its intentions before tabling the bill in Parliament, emphasizing that it was not seeking any permission from the court. The application aimed to seek appropriate clarifications from the court regarding the CPIL judgment in 2012, to establish a spectrum assignment framework that includes methods of assignment other than auction in suitable cases, to best serve the common good. In 2012, the SC had criticized the ‘first-come, first served’ method for spectrum allocation, known as the CPIL judgment, and had quashed the 2G spectrum allotted by the United Progressive Alliance government.

Since then, the government has been issuing spectrum administratively in certain cases where auctions are not technically or economically preferred or optimal. The Telecom Bill’s First Schedule lists satellite spectrum and 18 other sectors where administrative allocations will be compulsory, including law enforcement, public broadcasting, in-flight and maritime connectivity, the Indian Army and Coast Guard, and radio backhaul for telecom services. Government sources noted that all stakeholders were consulted on the issue, and the government was confident of its legal standing as outlined in the Telecommunications Act.

The SC, in a presidential reference, did not specify that all spectrum should be auctioned, only that for mobile services. The Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the government’s application seeking clarification on spectrum allocation for non-mobile services does not alter the framework outlined in the Telecom Bill. While auctions remain the preferred method for mobile services, administrative allocations will continue for specific use cases, including satellite spectrum, as delineated in the bill.

The rejection of the application underscores the importance of adherence to established legal procedures and the judiciary’s role in upholding regulatory frameworks. Moving forward, the government remains committed to transparent and efficient spectrum allocation, balancing the imperatives of economic efficiency and public interest in the telecommunications sector.

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Legally Speaking

Legal Victory for Ankiti Bose: Limits Imposed on Defamatory Content Regarding Former Zilingo Chief

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A legal dispute has unfolded involving B2B fashion startup Zilingo, with former CEO Ankiti Bose on one side, and co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya on the opposing side.

A recent court decision in Delhi has brought focus to a legal dispute involving Ankiti Bose, the former CEO of Zilingo, a prominent technology platform. The court issued an ex parte order in Bose’s favor, instructing certain parties, including Zilingo co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya, to refrain from making defamatory statements against Bose. This decision underscores the importance of protecting reputational rights against unfair reporting.

The court’s ruling cited a prima facie case in Bose’s favor, acknowledging her legal right to safeguard her reputation from damaging remarks. It emphasized that failure to act promptly could lead to irreparable harm to Bose’s reputation. The order specifically bars Kapoor and Vaidya from making any further defamatory postings against the former CEO.

This legal action stems from a broader conflict within Zilingo, a B2B fashion startup that has faced financial struggles since its inception in 2015. Bose’s departure from the company was contentious, marked by allegations of misconduct and underperformance. She subsequently filed a First Information Report (FIR) accusing Kapoor and Vaidya of sexual harassment and business irregularities. In response, the accused have dismissed these claims as retaliatory, asserting that Bose’s actions were prompted by her dismissal from the company.

The litigation highlights the complexities of corporate disputes and the broader implications for individuals and businesses. Beyond the legalities, it reflects the challenges faced by startups navigating internal strife amidst financial difficulties. Zilingo’s trajectory, from inception to liquidation, encapsulates the turbulent landscape of the tech industry and underscores the importance of legal protections for individuals like Bose seeking to safeguard their professional standing amidst controversy. The court’s intervention serves as a reminder of the gravity of reputational issues in the modern corporate environment, particularly amidst the complexities of startup dynamics and leadership disputes.

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Supreme Court In Patanjali Case: Concerned With All FMCG/Drugs Companies Affecting Lives Of Children And Elderly Through Misleading Ads

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The Supreme Court in the case Indian Medical Association v. Union Of India observed and has clarified against Patanjali over publication of misleading advertisements that it was not dealing with Patanjali as a standalone entity; rather, the Court’s concern, in public interest, extended to all those Fast Moving Consumer Goods, FMCGs or drugs companies which take consumers of their products for a ride through misleading advertisements. The bench comprising of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah in its order stated that, this court must clarify that we are not here to gun for a particular party, or a particular agency or a particular authority.

This being the absolute Public Interest Litigation, PIL since it is in the larger interest of the consumers, the public to know which way they are going and how and why they can be misled and how […] is acting to prevent that misuse. Thus, at the end, this is also as we said a part of the process of rule of law. If that is violated, then it affects […].

The court in the case observed that the implementation of laws regulating misleading ads in relation to medicines require deeper examination, as the products are used for babies, school going children and senior citizens based on the ads: Further, the court stated that this court is of the opinion that the issue which relates to implementation of the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act and the Rules, the Drugs and Cosmetic Act and the Rules, and the Consumers Act and the relevant Rules needs closer examination in the light of the grievances raised by the petitioner…not just limited to the respondents before this court but to all similarly situated or placed FMCGs who have […] misleading advertisements, and taking the public for a ride…affecting the health of babies, school going children and senior citizens who have been consuming products on the basis of the said misrepresentation.

The court while taking into account the misleading ads issued in electronic media impleaded the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Information Technology, and Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Therefore, the same was being done with a view to examine the steps taken by these Ministries to prevent abuse of Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 1954 (and the Rules), the Drugs and Cosmetic Act 1940 (and Rules) and the Consumer Protection Act. Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on May 07, 2024.

Background Of The Case:

The Court raps Uttarakhand authorities The said court also came down heavily on the State of Uttarakhand for the failure of its licensing authorities to take legal action against Patanjali and its subsidiary Divya Pharmacy. The bench also asked why it should not think that the authorities were ‘hand in glove’ with Patanjali or Divya Pharmacy.

The court in its order stated that it was ‘appalled’ to note that apart from ‘pushing the file’, the State Licensing Authorities did nothing and were merely trying to ‘pass on the buck’ to ‘somehow delay the matter.’ The court stated that the State Licensing Authority is “equally complicit” due to its inaction against Divya Pharmacy despite having information about t heir advertisements violating the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act.

Further, the court stated that it was refraining from issuing contempt notices to other officers. Further, the court directed that all officers holding the post of Joint Director of the State Licensing Authority, Haridwar between 2018 till date shall also file affidavits explaining inaction on their part.

Background of the Case:

The contempt case was initiated wherein the petition is filed by the Indian Medical Association against Patanjali’s advertisements attacking allopathy and making claims about curing certain diseases. On the Supreme Court reprimand, the Patanjali on last November had assured that it would refrain from such advertisements. The court in the case noted that the misleading advertisements continued, thus, the Court had issued contempt notice to Patanjali and its MD in February.

The court in march considering that reply to the contempt notice was not filed, the personal appearance of the Patanjali MD as well as Baba Ramdev, who featured in the press conferences and advertisements published after the undertaking, was ordered by the said Court. Therefore, the Patanjali MD filed an affidavit wherein it is stated that the impugned advertisements were meant to contain only general statements but inadvertently included offending sentences. Further, the court stated that the advertisements were bona-fide and that Patanjali’s media personnel was not ‘cognizant’ of the November order (wherein the undertaking was given before the Supreme Court).

The affidavit filed also contained an averment that the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act was in an “archaic state” as it was enacted at a time when scientific evidence regarding Ayurvedic medicines was lacking. On the last date of hearing, both Baba Ramdev and MD Balkrishna were physically present in Court. The court expressed its reservations about MD Balkrishna’s affidavit, calling it “perfunctory” and “mere lip service”. The court gave last opportunity to the alleged contemnors for filing a proper affidavit.

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