Wife bent upon destroying husband’s career & reputation amounts to ‘mental cruelty’: Punjab and Haryana High Court - Business Guardian
Connect with us

Legally Speaking

Wife bent upon destroying husband’s career & reputation amounts to ‘mental cruelty’: Punjab and Haryana High Court

Published

on

Without mincing any words whatsoever and without beating about the bush, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in an extremely learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Devesh Yadav v. Smt. Meenal in FAO-M-208 of 2013 that was reserved on 30.03.2022 and then finally pronounced on 08.04.2022 has observed explicitly, eloquently and elegantly that if the wife is bent upon destroying the career and reputation of her husband by making complaints against him to his senior officers, then it would amount to mental cruelty and the same would entitle the man to divorce. It must be mentioned that the Bench of Justice Ritu Bahri and Justice Ashok Kumar Verma observed thus, while hearing a plea that was filed by an Indian Air Force (IAF) personnel who sought a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Consequently, we thus see that the Court very rightly granted a decree of divorce and allowed the plea while noting specifically that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again.

To start with, this extremely commendable, cogent, composed and creditworthy judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashok Kumar Verma for a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Ms Justice Ritu Bahri sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The appellant-husband has come up in appeal before this Court seeking setting aside of judgment and decree dated 26.02.2013 passed by the District Judge, Rohtak, whereby petition filed by him under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the HMA’) for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce, has been dismissed.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then while elaborating on the facts of the case envisages in para 2 that, “Brief facts of the case are that appellant-husband filed a petition under Section 13 of the HMA for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce pleading therein that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.11.1998 and the same was registered on 23.11.1998 at Rohtak. At the time of marriage, appellant-husband was posted at Srinagar and they lived there upto March, 2000. Respondent-wife insisted that delivery of the child should take place at Rohtak, therefore, appellant acceded to her request and they went to Rohtak, where they were blessed with a son, namely, Jalaj on 24.08.1999. Thereafter, appellant was transferred to Jammu and parties lived together there upto April, 2002. The appellant remained posted at Jammu upto September, 2002 and then was transferred to Lucknow. It is alleged by the appellant-husband that from the beginning of the marriage, conduct, behaviour and attitude of the respondent-wife had been cruel, unwarranted and harsh and she used to pick up quarrels over trifles without any justifiable cause. The respondent deserted the appellant in April, 2002 and since then she had not returned to matrimonial home, whereas appellant had always been giving love and affection to the respondent and his son. In the beginning of December, 1999 appellant had taken the respondent along with his son to his place of posting at Srinagar and at the request of respondent her mother was also taken there and appellant provided proper food, clothing and every good lodging facility to the respondent, her mother and the son. In mid December, 1999, respondent suffered with breast abscess and she was got treated and operated at Army Hospital, Srinagar. In December, 1999, respondent was again operated at PGIMS, Rohtak, as the said ailment had re-developed. In April, 2002, respondent went to the house of her parents at Rohtak and thereafter in spite of best efforts of the appellant, she did not return to her matrimonial home. Appellant had also written several letters from the place of his posting requesting respondent and her parents to send the respondent and his son to him but in vain. Whenever, appellant came on leave at Rohtak and tried to meet his wife and the child, respondent’s parents did not allow him to meet them. Rather, Pawan, brother of the respondent, misbehaved with the appellant whenever appellant visited the house of his in-laws. Appellant also met the respondent in April, 2006 and requested her to accompany him and apprised her that he had booked seats for journey but she flatly refused to accompany him and threatened that if he tried to take her with him, she would commit suicide. It is further alleged that respondent failed to discharge her matrimonial duties and obligations and rather she ill-treated and mal-treated the appellant, caused physical and mental cruelty upon him, did not cooperate in married life and made his life hell. The respondent even failed to give any respect and regard to the parents of the appellant. When respondent expressed her desire to do a job, appellant agreed to her request and she had worked at Army Public School, Jammu, from July, 2001 to March, 2002. As in spite of best efforts made by the appellant, respondent did not join the matrimonial home, he was compelled to institute a divorce petition bearing No.58 of 2006. The matter was referred to Lok Adalat/mediation. During the course of these proceedings, respondent agreed to withdraw her complaint made to the Air Force authorities as well as the application for maintenance filed before the Senior Air Force Officer, on withdrawal of said petition by the appellant. The matter was compromised on the basis of separate statements dated 21.12.2008 and the petition filed by the appellant was dismissed as withdrawn. Appellant further alleged that respondent was working as lecturer in mathematics in Matu Ram Institute of Engineering and Management at Rohtak. Even during vacations she never joined the company of the appellant. Despite having given undertaking before the Court in her statement dated 21.12.2008, she had not withdrawn her complaint and maintenance application filed before the Senior Air Force Officer and did not join the company of the appellant at the matrimonial home at the place of his posting i.e. at M.E.T. Flight Air Force Station, Sirsa (Haryana). Therefore, appellant sought decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.”

Needless to say, the Bench then observes in para 13 that, “It is undisputed fact that the marriage between the appellant and respondent was solemnized on 19.11.1998 and the same was registered on 23.11.1998. On 24.08.1999 a child, namely, Jalaj was born out of the wedlock. According to the appellant, in the month of April, 2002, the respondent left the company of the appellant and went to her parents’ house and the efforts made by the appellant to bring her back went in vain. It is the specific case of the respondent-wife that she never deserted the appellant nor caused any cruelty to him. The Family Court, considering the averments of both the parties, dismissed the petition filed by the husband under Section 13 of the HMA.”

As we see, the Bench then notes in para 14 that, “In view of the above circumstances, before proceeding with the appeal on merits, taking into consideration the fact that the parties were residing separately for about 12 years, vide order dated 28.04.2014, the parties were directed to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court on 19.05.2014. However, on several occasions parties did not appear before the mediator. Therefore, due to lackadaisical approach of both the parties to settle the matter and due to expiry of the stipulated period, mediator referred back the matter to this Court on 14.08.2014. Thus, the appeal was admitted on 20.02.2015.”

In hindsight, the Bench then recalls in para 15 that, “Being fed up of the behavior of the respondent-wife, earlier also appellant had instituted a petition for divorce bearing No.58 of 2006, which was referred to the Lok Adalat. The matter was compromised on 21.12.2008 and on assurance of the respondent to withdraw her complaint made to the Air Force authorities and the application for maintenance filed by her before the senior Air Force officer, appellant had withdrawn the said petition for divorce.”

To be sure, the Bench notes in para 21 that, “Respondent wife also bent upon destroying the career and reputation of the appellant-husband as she made complaints against him to his senior officers in the Air Force.”

Briefly stated, the Bench mentions in para 22 that, “At this juncture, it is important to make reference to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Talreja vs. Kavita Talreja, Civil Appeal No.10719 of 2013, decided on 24.04.2017, wherein, it was held that a false complaint was registered against the husband by the wife, after wife herself inflicted injuries on her person. In criminal proceedings, the husband had been acquitted and thereafter, proceedings against the wife were launched. On this account, the husband was held entitled to decree of divorce, on the ground of cruelty.”

Likewise, the Bench then also points out in para 23 that, “Likewise in Joydeep Majumdar vs. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, Civil Appeal Nos.3786-3787 of 2020, decided on 26.02.2021 (Law Finder Doc Id #1813316), where defamatory complaints had been made by wife to husband’s superior officers and the complaint so made by the wife was held to have affected the career progress of the husband, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that it amounted to ‘mental cruelty’ as the husband had suffered adverse consequences, in his life and career, on account of allegations, made by wife. The Family Court, had granted divorce to the husband, on the ground of cruelty. However, the High Court had reversed the finding of the Family Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while deciding the matter, referred to another judgment passed in Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, 2007 (4) SCC 511, wherein, it was observed that in order to make out a case of mental cruelty, no uniform standard can be laid down and each case will have to be decided, on its own facts. Further, in Joydeep Majumdar’s case (supra), it was observed as herein given:-

“11. The materials in the present case reveal that the respondent had made several defamatory complaints to the appellant’s superiors in the Army for which, a Court of inquiry was held by the Army authorities against the appellant. Primarily for those, the appellant’s career progress got affected. The Respondent was also making complaints to other authorities, such as, the State Commission for Women and has posted defamatory materials on other platforms. The net outcome of above is that the appellant’s career and reputation had suffered.

12. When the appellant has suffered adverse consequences in his life and career on account of the allegations made by the respondent, the legal consequences must follow and those cannot be prevented only because, no Court has determined that the allegations were false. The High Court however felt that without any definite finding on the credibility of the wife’s allegation, the wronged spouse would be disentitled to relief. This is not found to be the correct way to deal with the issue.

13. Proceeding with the above understanding, the question which requires to be answered here is whether the conduct of the respondent would fall within the realm of mental cruelty. Here the allegations are levelled by a highly educated spouse and they do have the propensity to irreparably damage the character and reputation of the appellant. When the reputation of the spouse is sullied amongst his colleagues, his superiors and the society at large, it would be difficult to expect condonation of such conduct by the affected party.””

Be it noted, the Bench then minces no words to state in para 26 that, “The conduct of the respondent-wife in filing a complaint making unfounded, indecent and defamatory allegations against her husband and parents-in-law indicates that she made all attempts to ensure that appellant and his parents are put in jail and the appellant is removed from his job. We have no manner of doubt that this conduct of respondent-wife has caused mental cruelty to the appellant-husband.”

Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 30 that, “In the present case, the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again. Further, not to grant decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties.”

In retrospect, the Bench then recalls in para 31 that, “The three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in a case of Samar Ghosh (supra) passed the decree on the ground of mental cruelty but the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been discussed in detail referring the 71st report of the Law Commission of India.”

While referring to a relevant case law, the Bench then points out in para 32 that, “Hon’ble the Supreme Court in a case of K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa (supra) has observed that though irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, however, marriage which is dead for all purposes, cannot be revived by Court’s verdict, if parties are not willing since marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they have dried up, there is hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion created by court decree.”

Adding more to it, the Bench then remarks in para 33 that, “Now, once the respondent-wife who is not staying with the appellant for the last about 20 years and is not ready to give mutual divorce to the appellant-husband, reference at this stage can be made to Naveen Kohli’s case (supra), which was a case of cruelty (physical and mental) where Hon’ble the Supreme Court considered the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In this case as well, the parties were living separately for the last 10 years and the wife was not ready to give divorce to the husband. Hon’ble the Supreme Court granted decree of divorce but directed the husband to pay a sum of Rs.25 lacs towards permanent maintenance. In para 58, it has been observed as under:-

“58. The High Court ought to have considered the repercussions, consequences, impact and ramifications of all the criminal and other proceedings initiated by the parties against each other in proper perspective. For illustration, the High Court has mentioned that so far as the publication of the news item is concerned, the status of husband in a registered company was only that of an employee and if any news item is published, in such a situation, it could not, by any stretch of imagination be taken to have lowered the prestige of the husband. In the next para 69 of the judgment that in one of the news item what has been indicated was that in the company, Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd., the appellant was only a Director along with Mrs. Neelu Kohli whom held 94.5% share of Rs.100/- each in the company. The news item further indicated that Naveen Kohli was acting against the spirit of the Article of the Association of Nikhil Rubber (P) Ltd., had caused immense loss of business and goodwill. He has stealthily removed produce of the company, besides diverted orders of foreign buyers to his proprietorship firm M/s Navneet Elastomers. He had opened bank account with forged signatures of Mrs. Neelu Kohli and fabricated resolution of the Board of Directors of the company. Statutory authorityCompanies Act had refused to register documents filed by Mr. Naveen Kolhi and had issued show cause notice. All business associates were cautioned to avoid dealing with him alone. Neither the company nor Mrs. Neelu Kohli shall be liable for the acts of Mr. Naveen Kohli. Despite the aforementioned finding that the news item was intended to caution business associates to avoid dealing with the appellant then to come to this finding in the next para that it will by no stretch of imagination result in mental cruelty is wholly untenable.””

Most remarkably, the Bench then while taking a pragmatic stand minces no words to state in para 34 that, “It is well settled that once the parties have separated and separation has continued for a sufficient length of time and anyone of them presented a petition for divorce, it can well be presumed that the marriage has broken down. The Court, no doubt, should seriously make an endeavour to reconcile the parties; yet, if it is found that the breakdown is irreparable, then divorce should not be withheld. The consequences of preservation in law of the unworkable marriage which has long ceased to be effective are bound to be a source of greater misery for the parties.”

Simply put, the Bench then recollects in para 35 that, “In the present case, the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife are living separately since April, 2002. Firstly, efforts were made to resolve the matrimonial dispute through the process of mediation, which is one of the effective mode of alternative mechanism in resolving the personal dispute but in vain.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 36 that, “Applying the ratio of the above-mentioned judgments to the facts of the present case and keeping in view the extraordinary facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal is allowed, judgment dated 26.02.2013 passed by the District Judge, Rohtak, is set aside and decree of divorce is granted accordingly in favour of the appellant-husband. Decreesheet be prepared accordingly. However, we direct the appellant-husband to make an F.D. of Rs 20 lakhs as permanent alimony in the name of the respondent-wife.”

In sum, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising of Hon’ble Ms Justice Ritu Bahri and Hon’ble Mr Justice Ashok Kumar Verma have taken a very balanced, bold and brilliant stand in this notable judgment. It has rightly, rationally and remarkably directed the husband to make an F.D. of Rs 20 lakhs as permanent alimony in the name of the respondent-wife so that she does not face financial distress. But it also simultaneously ensures that it allows the appeal of husband for being granted divorce by stipulating that if the wife is bent upon destroying the career and reputation of her husband by making complaints against him to his senior officers, then it would amount to mental cruelty and the same would entitle the man to divorce. Very rightly so!

The Daily Guardian is now on Telegram. Click here to join our channel (@thedailyguardian) and stay updated with the latest headlines.

For the latest news Download The Daily Guardian App.

Legally Speaking

Supreme Court holds off on decision in Baba Ramdev contempt case

Published

on

The Supreme Court has deferred its decision on a contempt notice issued against yoga guru Ramdev, his associate Balkrishna, and their company Patanjali Ayurved in connection with a case involving misleading advertisements. The bench, comprising Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, stated, “Orders on the contempt notice issued to respondents 5 to 7 (Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, Balkrishna, and Ramdev) are reserved.” The Uttarakhand State Licensing Authority (SLA) informed the court that manufacturing licenses for 14 products of Patanjali Ayurved Ltd and Divya Pharmacy have been suspended immediately. The Supreme Court noted that the counsel representing the firm had requested time to submit an affidavit detailing the actions taken to retract the advertisements of Patanjali products and to recall the medicines.

Highlighting the importance of public awareness and responsible influence, the court emphasized that Baba Ramdev wields significant influence and should employ it responsibly. It awaits an affidavit from Patanjali outlining the measures implemented to withdraw the existing misleading advertisements of the company’s products, with instructions for submission within three weeks.

During the proceedings, Indian Medical Association (IMA) President R V Asokan extended an unconditional apology to the bench for remarks made against the top court in a recent interview with news agency PTI. Justice Kohli conveyed to Asokan that public figures cannot criticize the court in media interviews. However, the court indicated its disinclination to accept the apology affidavit submitted by the IMA president at present. In an earlier hearing on May 7, the apex court had denounced Asokan’s statements as “very, very unacceptable.” The court reiterated its stance that celebrities and social media influencers are equally liable for the products they endorse, warning that if such products are found to be misleading, they could face repercussions.

The case stems from a plea filed in 2022 by the IMA alleging a smear campaign by Patanjali against the Covid-19 vaccination drive and modern medical systems. As the legal proceedings unfold, the Supreme Court continues to emphasize the importance of accountability and responsible conduct in advertising and public discourse. The case underscores the need for stringent regulations to curb misleading advertisements and ensure consumer protection. With the demand for transparency and ethical practices on the rise, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in upholding standards of integrity in commercial communications.

As the court awaits the submission of the affidavit from Patanjali, stakeholders across industries are keenly observing the developments, anticipating their implications on advertising practices and regulatory enforcement in the country.

Continue Reading

Tech

Australia fights Musk’s platform over control of online content

Published

on

In a courtroom battle that underscores the complex interplay between global tech giants and national regulatory frameworks, Elon Musk’s X, formerly known as Twitter, finds itself at odds with Australian law over the removal of graphic content depicting a terrorist attack.

At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question: to what extent should a platform like X be compelled to adhere to the laws of a specific country when it comes to content moderation? The legal showdown commenced as the eSafety Commissioner of Australia sought the removal of 65 posts showcasing a harrowing video of an Assyrian Christian bishop being stabbed during a sermon in Sydney, classified as a terrorist incident by authorities.

Tim Begbie, representing the cyber regulator, argued that while X has policies in place to remove harmful content, it cannot claim unilateral authority to decide what is acceptable under Australian law. He contended that X’s resistance to globally removing the posts challenges the notion of reasonableness within the scope of Australia’s Online Safety Act.

X’s stance, guided by its mission to uphold free speech, underscores a broader philosophical debate surrounding the jurisdictional reach of national laws in the digital realm. The company maintains that while it has blocked access to the posts for Australian users, it refuses to implement global removal, asserting that the internet should not be governed by the laws of a single nation.

However, Begbie argued that geo-blocking, the solution proposed by X, is ineffective due to the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs) by a significant portion of the Australian population.

Amidst the legal wrangling, X’s lawyer, Bret Walker, contended that the company had taken reasonable steps to comply with Australian laws while balancing the principles of free expression. He emphasized the importance of allowing global access to newsworthy content, cautioning against the suppression of information on a global scale. The implications of such an approach, he argued, extend beyond Australia’s borders, potentially setting a precedent for censorship on a global scale.

As the case unfolds in the Federal Court, Judge Geoffrey Kennett has issued a temporary takedown order for the posts, extending it until June 10 pending a final decision. The outcome of this legal battle is poised to have far-reaching implications, not only for the regulation of online content in Australia but also for the broader discourse surrounding internet governance and free speech in the digital age.

Beyond the legal arguments, the case underscores the evolving dynamics between tech platforms and regulatory authorities, highlighting the challenges of reconciling competing interests in an increasingly interconnected world. With the proliferation of digital platforms and the rise of social media, questions surrounding content moderation, censorship, and the balance between freedom of expression and societal harm have come to the forefront of public discourse.

In the digital era, where information knows no borders and online platforms wield immense influence over public discourse, the case of X versus Australian law serves as a microcosm of the broader tensions between technology, governance, and individual rights. As societies grapple with the complexities of the digital age, the need for robust legal frameworks, ethical guidelines, and international cooperation becomes ever more apparent.

As the legal battle between X and Australian authorities unfolds, it underscores the intricate relationship between technology, law, and societal norms in the digital age. At stake is not just the removal of graphic content depicting a heinous act but also the broader principles of free speech, censorship, and the jurisdictional reach of national regulations in a globalized world.

The outcome of this case carries significant implications for the future of online content moderation and regulation. On one hand, proponents of free speech argue that platforms like X should have the autonomy to determine their content policies without being unduly influenced by the laws of individual countries. They contend that a global approach to content moderation ensures consistency and prevents the fragmentation of the internet along national lines.

On the other hand, proponents of regulation argue that national laws play a crucial role in safeguarding citizens from harmful content and upholding community standards. They assert that while platforms may operate globally, they must abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate, particularly when it comes to content that poses a threat to public safety or incites violence.

Amidst these competing interests, the case highlights the need for a nuanced approach to content moderation that balances the principles of free speech with the protection of users from harm. It also underscores the importance of international cooperation and dialogue in addressing cross-border challenges in the digital realm.

Beyond the legal realm, the case has broader implications for the future of internet governance and the regulation of online platforms. As technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace, policymakers around the world face the daunting task of crafting regulations that are effective, enforceable, and adaptable to the ever-changing digital landscape.

Moreover, the case raises important questions about the role of tech companies in shaping public discourse and influencing democratic processes. With social media platforms serving as key channels for information dissemination and political engagement, the decisions made by companies like X have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of democratic societies.

Ultimately, the resolution of this case will have significant implications not only for X and its users but also for the broader digital ecosystem. It will shape the future trajectory of online content moderation, influence regulatory approaches to technology platforms, and set precedents for how governments and tech companies interact in the digital age.

As the legal proceedings continue, stakeholders from across sectors will closely monitor developments, recognizing that the outcome of this case has the potential to reshape the digital landscape for years to come. Whether it leads to greater clarity in content moderation policies, a re-evaluation of regulatory frameworks, or a deeper understanding of the complexities of governing the internet, the case of X versus Australian law represents a pivotal moment in the ongoing debate over the future of online governance and free speech in the digital age.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

Supreme Court Framed Issues To Consider, Hearing In July 2024: Challenge To Surrogacy Law

Published

on

SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court in the case Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India has elucidated the issues it will consider in a batch of petitions challenging provisions of the Surrogacy Regulation Act, 2021 and the Surrogacy Regulation Rules, 2022. The bench comprising of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice AG Masih passed the order recording the following issues:

  1. Whether the prohibition of commercial surrogacy as stated under Section 4(ii)(b) and Section 4(ii)(c) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 is constitutional?
  2. Whether the right of a couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to married couples between the age of 23 to 50 years and in case of female and between 26 to 55 years in case of male as it is being provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, is constitutional?
  3. Whether the right of a single woman to avail surrogacy being restricted to only widows or divorcees between the ages of 35 to 45 years as it is provided being under Section 2(1)(s) of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act 2021, is constitutional?
  4. Whether the right of an intending couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to only those couples who do not have a surviving child as provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(II) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021, is constitutional?
  5. Whether individuals who initiated the process of availing surrogacy which being prior to the enactment of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act, 2021 have any right to avail surrogacy in a manner which being beyond the scope of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, save for cases falling within the ambit of Section 53 of the Act?

The petitioner in the plea highlighted an additional issue which relates to exclusion of single men from the purview of Surrogacy Regulation Act.

Therefore, the lead petition in the matter has been filed by an infertility specialist from Chennai, Dr. Arun Muthuvel, through Advocate Mohini Priya and Advocate Ameyavikrama Thanvi.

Therefore, while highlighting various contradictions in the Surrogacy Regulation Act and the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, thus, the petitioner in the plea points out that the twin legislations inaugurated a legal regime that was discriminatory and was violative of the constitutional rights of privacy and reproductive autonomy.

The Supreme Court in the case observed and has agreed to hear the petition wherein it challenges against the two Acts. In September last year, several other petitions and applications were filed wherein similar questions were raised, such as whether it was constitutional to exclude unmarried women from the ambit of the Surrogacy Act, or whether limiting the number of donations made by an oocyte donor under the ART Act would amount to unscientific and irrational restrictions.

The bench in the case observed and has expressed reservations about hearing the challenges to both the Acts simultaneously, as the linkage between the provisions of the two Acts could not be ascertained in the present matter. Further, the said court decided that issues wrt the Surrogacy Regulation Act will be heard first, followed by those which relate to the ART Act.

The court asked the parties to file written submissions on the foregoing issues. It has also been clarified by the said court that the petitioners need not restrict their submissions to the issues recorded by the court. Any ‘related’ issue may also be raised during the proceedings.

Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on July 30, 2024.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

SC ruling on spectrum allocation doesn’t affect satellites

Published

on

SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the government’s application seeking clarification on administrative allocation of spectrum for non-mobile services is not expected to impact the allocation of satellite spectrum as outlined in the Telecom Bill, according to highly placed sources. In February 2012, the Supreme Court had upheld that auctions were the preferred method for allocating scarce public resources like telecom spectrum.

The Centre had filed a miscellaneous application in December last year seeking a clarification on the matter of administrative allocation of spectrum, which was mentioned in court last week. However, the SC registrar refused to accept the plea, arguing that it was seeking a review of the 2012 order and that there was no ‘reasonable cause’ to entertain it.

Government sources emphasized that this decision would not change the existing laws governing spectrum allocations for satellite communications, as clearly stated in the Telecom Bill. Sources clarified that the application did not seek to amend the 2012 judgment on 2G spectrum allotment nor did it seek permission for administratively allocating spectrum. Spectrum will continue to be auctioned for mobile services, while for the 19 specific use cases cited in the Telecom Bill, it will be allocated administratively.

The government had filed the miscellaneous application at the Supreme Court to explain its intentions before tabling the bill in Parliament, emphasizing that it was not seeking any permission from the court. The application aimed to seek appropriate clarifications from the court regarding the CPIL judgment in 2012, to establish a spectrum assignment framework that includes methods of assignment other than auction in suitable cases, to best serve the common good. In 2012, the SC had criticized the ‘first-come, first served’ method for spectrum allocation, known as the CPIL judgment, and had quashed the 2G spectrum allotted by the United Progressive Alliance government.

Since then, the government has been issuing spectrum administratively in certain cases where auctions are not technically or economically preferred or optimal. The Telecom Bill’s First Schedule lists satellite spectrum and 18 other sectors where administrative allocations will be compulsory, including law enforcement, public broadcasting, in-flight and maritime connectivity, the Indian Army and Coast Guard, and radio backhaul for telecom services. Government sources noted that all stakeholders were consulted on the issue, and the government was confident of its legal standing as outlined in the Telecommunications Act.

The SC, in a presidential reference, did not specify that all spectrum should be auctioned, only that for mobile services. The Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the government’s application seeking clarification on spectrum allocation for non-mobile services does not alter the framework outlined in the Telecom Bill. While auctions remain the preferred method for mobile services, administrative allocations will continue for specific use cases, including satellite spectrum, as delineated in the bill.

The rejection of the application underscores the importance of adherence to established legal procedures and the judiciary’s role in upholding regulatory frameworks. Moving forward, the government remains committed to transparent and efficient spectrum allocation, balancing the imperatives of economic efficiency and public interest in the telecommunications sector.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

Legal Victory for Ankiti Bose: Limits Imposed on Defamatory Content Regarding Former Zilingo Chief

Published

on

A legal dispute has unfolded involving B2B fashion startup Zilingo, with former CEO Ankiti Bose on one side, and co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya on the opposing side.

A recent court decision in Delhi has brought focus to a legal dispute involving Ankiti Bose, the former CEO of Zilingo, a prominent technology platform. The court issued an ex parte order in Bose’s favor, instructing certain parties, including Zilingo co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya, to refrain from making defamatory statements against Bose. This decision underscores the importance of protecting reputational rights against unfair reporting.

The court’s ruling cited a prima facie case in Bose’s favor, acknowledging her legal right to safeguard her reputation from damaging remarks. It emphasized that failure to act promptly could lead to irreparable harm to Bose’s reputation. The order specifically bars Kapoor and Vaidya from making any further defamatory postings against the former CEO.

This legal action stems from a broader conflict within Zilingo, a B2B fashion startup that has faced financial struggles since its inception in 2015. Bose’s departure from the company was contentious, marked by allegations of misconduct and underperformance. She subsequently filed a First Information Report (FIR) accusing Kapoor and Vaidya of sexual harassment and business irregularities. In response, the accused have dismissed these claims as retaliatory, asserting that Bose’s actions were prompted by her dismissal from the company.

The litigation highlights the complexities of corporate disputes and the broader implications for individuals and businesses. Beyond the legalities, it reflects the challenges faced by startups navigating internal strife amidst financial difficulties. Zilingo’s trajectory, from inception to liquidation, encapsulates the turbulent landscape of the tech industry and underscores the importance of legal protections for individuals like Bose seeking to safeguard their professional standing amidst controversy. The court’s intervention serves as a reminder of the gravity of reputational issues in the modern corporate environment, particularly amidst the complexities of startup dynamics and leadership disputes.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

Supreme Court In Patanjali Case: Concerned With All FMCG/Drugs Companies Affecting Lives Of Children And Elderly Through Misleading Ads

Published

on

The Supreme Court in the case Indian Medical Association v. Union Of India observed and has clarified against Patanjali over publication of misleading advertisements that it was not dealing with Patanjali as a standalone entity; rather, the Court’s concern, in public interest, extended to all those Fast Moving Consumer Goods, FMCGs or drugs companies which take consumers of their products for a ride through misleading advertisements. The bench comprising of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah in its order stated that, this court must clarify that we are not here to gun for a particular party, or a particular agency or a particular authority.

This being the absolute Public Interest Litigation, PIL since it is in the larger interest of the consumers, the public to know which way they are going and how and why they can be misled and how […] is acting to prevent that misuse. Thus, at the end, this is also as we said a part of the process of rule of law. If that is violated, then it affects […].

The court in the case observed that the implementation of laws regulating misleading ads in relation to medicines require deeper examination, as the products are used for babies, school going children and senior citizens based on the ads: Further, the court stated that this court is of the opinion that the issue which relates to implementation of the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act and the Rules, the Drugs and Cosmetic Act and the Rules, and the Consumers Act and the relevant Rules needs closer examination in the light of the grievances raised by the petitioner…not just limited to the respondents before this court but to all similarly situated or placed FMCGs who have […] misleading advertisements, and taking the public for a ride…affecting the health of babies, school going children and senior citizens who have been consuming products on the basis of the said misrepresentation.

The court while taking into account the misleading ads issued in electronic media impleaded the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Information Technology, and Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Therefore, the same was being done with a view to examine the steps taken by these Ministries to prevent abuse of Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 1954 (and the Rules), the Drugs and Cosmetic Act 1940 (and Rules) and the Consumer Protection Act. Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on May 07, 2024.

Background Of The Case:

The Court raps Uttarakhand authorities The said court also came down heavily on the State of Uttarakhand for the failure of its licensing authorities to take legal action against Patanjali and its subsidiary Divya Pharmacy. The bench also asked why it should not think that the authorities were ‘hand in glove’ with Patanjali or Divya Pharmacy.

The court in its order stated that it was ‘appalled’ to note that apart from ‘pushing the file’, the State Licensing Authorities did nothing and were merely trying to ‘pass on the buck’ to ‘somehow delay the matter.’ The court stated that the State Licensing Authority is “equally complicit” due to its inaction against Divya Pharmacy despite having information about t heir advertisements violating the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act.

Further, the court stated that it was refraining from issuing contempt notices to other officers. Further, the court directed that all officers holding the post of Joint Director of the State Licensing Authority, Haridwar between 2018 till date shall also file affidavits explaining inaction on their part.

Background of the Case:

The contempt case was initiated wherein the petition is filed by the Indian Medical Association against Patanjali’s advertisements attacking allopathy and making claims about curing certain diseases. On the Supreme Court reprimand, the Patanjali on last November had assured that it would refrain from such advertisements. The court in the case noted that the misleading advertisements continued, thus, the Court had issued contempt notice to Patanjali and its MD in February.

The court in march considering that reply to the contempt notice was not filed, the personal appearance of the Patanjali MD as well as Baba Ramdev, who featured in the press conferences and advertisements published after the undertaking, was ordered by the said Court. Therefore, the Patanjali MD filed an affidavit wherein it is stated that the impugned advertisements were meant to contain only general statements but inadvertently included offending sentences. Further, the court stated that the advertisements were bona-fide and that Patanjali’s media personnel was not ‘cognizant’ of the November order (wherein the undertaking was given before the Supreme Court).

The affidavit filed also contained an averment that the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act was in an “archaic state” as it was enacted at a time when scientific evidence regarding Ayurvedic medicines was lacking. On the last date of hearing, both Baba Ramdev and MD Balkrishna were physically present in Court. The court expressed its reservations about MD Balkrishna’s affidavit, calling it “perfunctory” and “mere lip service”. The court gave last opportunity to the alleged contemnors for filing a proper affidavit.

Continue Reading

Trending