SUMMONS BY REGISTERED POST CAN’T BE SERVED DIRECTLY TO DEFENDANT RESIDING OUTSIDE COURT’S JURISDICTION: PUNJAB & HARYANA HC - Business Guardian
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SUMMONS BY REGISTERED POST CAN’T BE SERVED DIRECTLY TO DEFENDANT RESIDING OUTSIDE COURT’S JURISDICTION: PUNJAB & HARYANA HC

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In a significant development, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled M/s Paras Ram Milkhi Ram vs Sudarshan Tea Pvt Ltd and Another in CR-2188-2015 (O&M) delivered as recently as on March 23, 2022 has made it quite clear that summons by registered post/acknowledgement due cannot directly be sent by the Court where the suit is instituted to a defendant residing outside it’s jurisdiction. The single Judge Bench of Justice Alka Sarin held that, “where the defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted and the Court directs that summons on such a defendant be served by registered post acknowledgement due, such summons have to be first sent to the Court having jurisdiction where the defendant resides and that Court would thereupon proceed to serve the defendant as if the summons were issued by that Court.” Very rightly so.

To start with, the single Judge Bench comprising of Justice Alka Sarin of Punjab and Haryana High Court first and foremost puts forth in this learned judgment that, “Heard through video conferencing. The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging order dated 08.01.2015 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangrur and 27.04.2011 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Moonak as well as the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 11.06.2015 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sunam.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in next para that, “Brief facts relevant to the present lis are that on 04.02.2004 the plaintiff-respondents herein filed a suit for recovery Rs.1,32,513/- against the defendant-petitioners. Vide order dated 05.02.2004, the Trial Court issued notice to the defendants-petitioners for 04.03.2004 on filing of registered cover. Summons were issued through registered post on 06.02.2004 for 04.03.2004. On 04.03.2004 the registered cover sent to the defendant-petitioners No.2 to 5 were received back with the report of refusal and hence they were proceeded against ex-parte. Since acknowledgment due qua defendant-petitioner No.1, namely, Satpal Mittal was not received, hence fresh notice was directed for 17.04.2004. On 17.04.2004 the acknowledgment due was received back with a report of refusal and in such circumstances the Court, having been satisfied that the defendant-petitioner No.1 could not be served through ordinary process, directed publication in the daily Chardikalan for 15.05.2004. On 15.05.2004 the case was adjourned to 18.05.2004 and on 18.05.2004 the case was adjourned to 24.07.2004 as publication had not been received back. Order dated 24.07.2004 records that the publication had duly been published in the Daily Chardikalan in its Edition dated 13.06.2004 and despite the matter being called several times none had appearance on behalf of defendant No.1. As such defendant No.1 was proceeded against ex-parte. On 11.06.2005 the suit was decreed ex-parte.”

As it turned out, the Bench then enunciates in the next para that, “Thereafter, an execution was filed at Moonak/Sunam, District Sangrur on 30.07.2005 which was transferred to District Patiala as the defendant-petitioners were residents of Patiala. It is the case set up that the Bailiff of the Court of Patiala came for attachment of the residential house of Milkhi Ram on 04.12.2007 and that is when the defendant-petitioners came to know of the decree passed by the Court at Moonak. On 02.01.2008 the defendant-petitioners filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree before the Trial Court at Moonak by pleading that they had not received the summons from the Court at Moonak and that the defendant-petitioners have never been served in the suit as also taking the defence that the amount had been received against receipt by Vinod Kumar Jain, Director of the plaintiff-respondent. However, the receipt had been misplaced. On 27.04.2011 the Trial Court dismissed the application for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree. Against the said order an appeal was preferred which also came to be dismissed on 08.01.2005. Aggrieved by the said two orders the present revision petition has been filed.”

As we see, after hearing both the sides, the Bench then observes that, “In the present case, the suit was filed at Sunam, District Sangrur and all the defendants were residing at Patiala as per the addresses mentioned in the plaint. The defendant-petitioners were, thus, residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court where the suit was instituted. The summons to the defendant-petitioners were sent to Patiala, District Patiala by registered post acknowledgement due by the Trial Court at Sunam, District Sangrur where the suit was instituted and were received back with reports of refusal. In the present case this Court has to examine if there was proper service upon the defendant-petitioners.”

Needless to say, the Bench then states that, “Under Order 5 Rule 9-A CPC, the Court may, in addition to the service of summons under Rule 9, on an application by the plaintiff, deliver summons to the plaintiff for serving on the defendant. Such summons have to be served personally upon the defendant by the plaintiff or on his behalf. The Rule makes no distinction between a defendant within or without the jurisdiction of the Court which issues the summons.”

Be it noted, the Bench then mentions in the next para that, “Order 5 Rule 21 CPC (as amended by Act No.46 of 1999) pertains to service of summons where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of another Court and reads as under:

“21. Service of summons where defendant resides within jurisdiction of another Court – A summons may be sent by the Court by which it is issued, whether within or without the State, either by one of its officers or by post or by such courier service as may be approved by the High Court, by fax message or by Electronic Mail service or by any other means as may be provided by the rules made by the High Court to any Court (not being the High Court) having jurisdiction in the place where the defendant resides.”

It may be mentioned here that for the States of Punjab, Haryana and UT Chandigarh Order 5 Rule 21 CPC, as existing prior to the amended Rule 21 reproduced above, was substituted by the following Rule 21 :

“A summons may be sent by the Court by which it is issued, whether within or without the State, either by one of its officers or by post to any Court (not being the High Court) having jurisdiction in the place where the defendant resides. Provided that where the defendant resides within the State at a place not exceeding sixteen kilometers from the place where the Court is situate, a summons may be delivered or sent by the Court to one of its officers to be served by him or one of his subordinates.”

Further, the Bench then holds in the next para that, “Thus, where a defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, or has an agent resident within that jurisdiction who is empowered to accept the service of the summons, the summons have to be delivered or sent either to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates or to such courier services as are approved by the Court. Further, the summons can be sent by registered post acknowledgment due or by speed post or by an approved courier service or by any other means of transmission of documents including fax, electronic mail service as provided by the rules made by the High Court.”

In addition, the Bench then also pointed out that, “However, where a defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, the summons to such a defendant can be sent directly by the Court, where the suit is instituted, by speed post, approved courier service or by any other means of transmission of documents including fax, electronic mail service as provided by the rules made by the High Court. For service by such means on a defendant residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court, the provisions of Order 5 Rule 21 shall not apply. Registered post acknowledgement due is specifically excluded in Order 5 Rule 9(4) CPC and, therefore, for service by registered post acknowledgement due on a defendant residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court, the provisions of Order 5 Rule 21 shall apply.”

Notably, the Bench then observes that, “Order 5 Rule 21 CPC makes it clear such that summons ordered to be served by registered post acknowledgement due on a defendant residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court would have to be sent to the Court having jurisdiction where the defendant resides. Under Order 5 Rule 23 CPC, the Court to which the summons are sent under Rule 21 shall proceed as if it had been issued by such Court. Order 5 Rule 23 CPC reads as under :

“Duty of Court to which summons is sent – The Court to which a summons is sent under Rule 21 or Rule 22 shall, upon receipt thereof, proceed as if it had been issued by such Court and shall then return the summons to the Court of issue, together with the record (if any) of its proceedings with regard thereto.”

Most significantly, the Bench then minces no words to hold unequivocally that, “These provisions make it clear that where the defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted and the Court directs that summons on such a defendant be served by registered post acknowledgement due, such summons have to be first sent to the Court having jurisdiction where the defendant resides and that Court would thereupon proceed to serve the defendant as if the summons were issued by that Court. Summons by registered post acknowledgement due cannot directly be sent by the Court where the suit is instituted to a defendant residing outside it’s jurisdiction. The decision by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Aar Kay Traders case (supra) is to the same effect.”

It is a no-brainer that the Bench then very rightly maintains that, “In the present case, admittedly, the defendant-petitioners were residing outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court where the suit was instituted. That being so, service sought to be effected upon them by way of registered post acknowledgement due directly by the Court where the suit was instituted cannot be deemed to be proper service and the procedure adopted by the Trial Court was contrary to that laid down in Order 5 Rules 9 and 21 CPC.”

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in the next para that, “In view of the discussion above, the present petition deserves to succeed and is consequently allowed. The impugned order dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangrur and the impugned order dated 27.04.2011 (Annexure P-5) passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Moonak as well as the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree dated 11.06.2015 (Annexure P-2) passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sunam are set aside. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed off.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in the final para that, “Parties through their counsel to appear before the Trial Court in Sunam on 04.04.2022 for further proceedings in the suit. Records summoned vide order dated 10.11.2017 be sent back to the Courts concerned.”

In a nutshell, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has made it indubitably clear in this extremely commendable judgment that, “Summons by registered post acknowledgement due cannot directly be sent by the Court where the suit is instituted to a defendant residing outside it’s jurisdiction.” Of course, all the courts must always in similar such cases adhere to what has been laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court so explicitly, elegantly, eloquently and effectively! There can certainly be just no denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate

A summons may be sent by the Court by which it is issued, whether within or without the State, either by one of its officers or by post to any Court (not being the High Court) having jurisdiction in the place where the defendant resides. Provided that where the defendant resides within the State at a place not exceeding sixteen kilometers from the place where the Court is situated, a summons may be delivered or sent by the Court to one of its officers to be served by him or one of his subordinates.

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court holds off on decision in Baba Ramdev contempt case

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The Supreme Court has deferred its decision on a contempt notice issued against yoga guru Ramdev, his associate Balkrishna, and their company Patanjali Ayurved in connection with a case involving misleading advertisements. The bench, comprising Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, stated, “Orders on the contempt notice issued to respondents 5 to 7 (Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, Balkrishna, and Ramdev) are reserved.” The Uttarakhand State Licensing Authority (SLA) informed the court that manufacturing licenses for 14 products of Patanjali Ayurved Ltd and Divya Pharmacy have been suspended immediately. The Supreme Court noted that the counsel representing the firm had requested time to submit an affidavit detailing the actions taken to retract the advertisements of Patanjali products and to recall the medicines.

Highlighting the importance of public awareness and responsible influence, the court emphasized that Baba Ramdev wields significant influence and should employ it responsibly. It awaits an affidavit from Patanjali outlining the measures implemented to withdraw the existing misleading advertisements of the company’s products, with instructions for submission within three weeks.

During the proceedings, Indian Medical Association (IMA) President R V Asokan extended an unconditional apology to the bench for remarks made against the top court in a recent interview with news agency PTI. Justice Kohli conveyed to Asokan that public figures cannot criticize the court in media interviews. However, the court indicated its disinclination to accept the apology affidavit submitted by the IMA president at present. In an earlier hearing on May 7, the apex court had denounced Asokan’s statements as “very, very unacceptable.” The court reiterated its stance that celebrities and social media influencers are equally liable for the products they endorse, warning that if such products are found to be misleading, they could face repercussions.

The case stems from a plea filed in 2022 by the IMA alleging a smear campaign by Patanjali against the Covid-19 vaccination drive and modern medical systems. As the legal proceedings unfold, the Supreme Court continues to emphasize the importance of accountability and responsible conduct in advertising and public discourse. The case underscores the need for stringent regulations to curb misleading advertisements and ensure consumer protection. With the demand for transparency and ethical practices on the rise, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in upholding standards of integrity in commercial communications.

As the court awaits the submission of the affidavit from Patanjali, stakeholders across industries are keenly observing the developments, anticipating their implications on advertising practices and regulatory enforcement in the country.

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Australia fights Musk’s platform over control of online content

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In a courtroom battle that underscores the complex interplay between global tech giants and national regulatory frameworks, Elon Musk’s X, formerly known as Twitter, finds itself at odds with Australian law over the removal of graphic content depicting a terrorist attack.

At the heart of the dispute lies a fundamental question: to what extent should a platform like X be compelled to adhere to the laws of a specific country when it comes to content moderation? The legal showdown commenced as the eSafety Commissioner of Australia sought the removal of 65 posts showcasing a harrowing video of an Assyrian Christian bishop being stabbed during a sermon in Sydney, classified as a terrorist incident by authorities.

Tim Begbie, representing the cyber regulator, argued that while X has policies in place to remove harmful content, it cannot claim unilateral authority to decide what is acceptable under Australian law. He contended that X’s resistance to globally removing the posts challenges the notion of reasonableness within the scope of Australia’s Online Safety Act.

X’s stance, guided by its mission to uphold free speech, underscores a broader philosophical debate surrounding the jurisdictional reach of national laws in the digital realm. The company maintains that while it has blocked access to the posts for Australian users, it refuses to implement global removal, asserting that the internet should not be governed by the laws of a single nation.

However, Begbie argued that geo-blocking, the solution proposed by X, is ineffective due to the widespread use of virtual private networks (VPNs) by a significant portion of the Australian population.

Amidst the legal wrangling, X’s lawyer, Bret Walker, contended that the company had taken reasonable steps to comply with Australian laws while balancing the principles of free expression. He emphasized the importance of allowing global access to newsworthy content, cautioning against the suppression of information on a global scale. The implications of such an approach, he argued, extend beyond Australia’s borders, potentially setting a precedent for censorship on a global scale.

As the case unfolds in the Federal Court, Judge Geoffrey Kennett has issued a temporary takedown order for the posts, extending it until June 10 pending a final decision. The outcome of this legal battle is poised to have far-reaching implications, not only for the regulation of online content in Australia but also for the broader discourse surrounding internet governance and free speech in the digital age.

Beyond the legal arguments, the case underscores the evolving dynamics between tech platforms and regulatory authorities, highlighting the challenges of reconciling competing interests in an increasingly interconnected world. With the proliferation of digital platforms and the rise of social media, questions surrounding content moderation, censorship, and the balance between freedom of expression and societal harm have come to the forefront of public discourse.

In the digital era, where information knows no borders and online platforms wield immense influence over public discourse, the case of X versus Australian law serves as a microcosm of the broader tensions between technology, governance, and individual rights. As societies grapple with the complexities of the digital age, the need for robust legal frameworks, ethical guidelines, and international cooperation becomes ever more apparent.

As the legal battle between X and Australian authorities unfolds, it underscores the intricate relationship between technology, law, and societal norms in the digital age. At stake is not just the removal of graphic content depicting a heinous act but also the broader principles of free speech, censorship, and the jurisdictional reach of national regulations in a globalized world.

The outcome of this case carries significant implications for the future of online content moderation and regulation. On one hand, proponents of free speech argue that platforms like X should have the autonomy to determine their content policies without being unduly influenced by the laws of individual countries. They contend that a global approach to content moderation ensures consistency and prevents the fragmentation of the internet along national lines.

On the other hand, proponents of regulation argue that national laws play a crucial role in safeguarding citizens from harmful content and upholding community standards. They assert that while platforms may operate globally, they must abide by the laws of the countries in which they operate, particularly when it comes to content that poses a threat to public safety or incites violence.

Amidst these competing interests, the case highlights the need for a nuanced approach to content moderation that balances the principles of free speech with the protection of users from harm. It also underscores the importance of international cooperation and dialogue in addressing cross-border challenges in the digital realm.

Beyond the legal realm, the case has broader implications for the future of internet governance and the regulation of online platforms. As technology continues to evolve at a rapid pace, policymakers around the world face the daunting task of crafting regulations that are effective, enforceable, and adaptable to the ever-changing digital landscape.

Moreover, the case raises important questions about the role of tech companies in shaping public discourse and influencing democratic processes. With social media platforms serving as key channels for information dissemination and political engagement, the decisions made by companies like X have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of democratic societies.

Ultimately, the resolution of this case will have significant implications not only for X and its users but also for the broader digital ecosystem. It will shape the future trajectory of online content moderation, influence regulatory approaches to technology platforms, and set precedents for how governments and tech companies interact in the digital age.

As the legal proceedings continue, stakeholders from across sectors will closely monitor developments, recognizing that the outcome of this case has the potential to reshape the digital landscape for years to come. Whether it leads to greater clarity in content moderation policies, a re-evaluation of regulatory frameworks, or a deeper understanding of the complexities of governing the internet, the case of X versus Australian law represents a pivotal moment in the ongoing debate over the future of online governance and free speech in the digital age.

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court Framed Issues To Consider, Hearing In July 2024: Challenge To Surrogacy Law

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court in the case Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India has elucidated the issues it will consider in a batch of petitions challenging provisions of the Surrogacy Regulation Act, 2021 and the Surrogacy Regulation Rules, 2022. The bench comprising of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice AG Masih passed the order recording the following issues:

  1. Whether the prohibition of commercial surrogacy as stated under Section 4(ii)(b) and Section 4(ii)(c) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 is constitutional?
  2. Whether the right of a couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to married couples between the age of 23 to 50 years and in case of female and between 26 to 55 years in case of male as it is being provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, is constitutional?
  3. Whether the right of a single woman to avail surrogacy being restricted to only widows or divorcees between the ages of 35 to 45 years as it is provided being under Section 2(1)(s) of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act 2021, is constitutional?
  4. Whether the right of an intending couple to avail surrogacy being restricted to only those couples who do not have a surviving child as provided as stated under Section 4(iii)(c)(II) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021, is constitutional?
  5. Whether individuals who initiated the process of availing surrogacy which being prior to the enactment of the Surrogacy, the Regulation Act, 2021 have any right to avail surrogacy in a manner which being beyond the scope of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, save for cases falling within the ambit of Section 53 of the Act?

The petitioner in the plea highlighted an additional issue which relates to exclusion of single men from the purview of Surrogacy Regulation Act.

Therefore, the lead petition in the matter has been filed by an infertility specialist from Chennai, Dr. Arun Muthuvel, through Advocate Mohini Priya and Advocate Ameyavikrama Thanvi.

Therefore, while highlighting various contradictions in the Surrogacy Regulation Act and the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, thus, the petitioner in the plea points out that the twin legislations inaugurated a legal regime that was discriminatory and was violative of the constitutional rights of privacy and reproductive autonomy.

The Supreme Court in the case observed and has agreed to hear the petition wherein it challenges against the two Acts. In September last year, several other petitions and applications were filed wherein similar questions were raised, such as whether it was constitutional to exclude unmarried women from the ambit of the Surrogacy Act, or whether limiting the number of donations made by an oocyte donor under the ART Act would amount to unscientific and irrational restrictions.

The bench in the case observed and has expressed reservations about hearing the challenges to both the Acts simultaneously, as the linkage between the provisions of the two Acts could not be ascertained in the present matter. Further, the said court decided that issues wrt the Surrogacy Regulation Act will be heard first, followed by those which relate to the ART Act.

The court asked the parties to file written submissions on the foregoing issues. It has also been clarified by the said court that the petitioners need not restrict their submissions to the issues recorded by the court. Any ‘related’ issue may also be raised during the proceedings.

Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on July 30, 2024.

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Legally Speaking

SC ruling on spectrum allocation doesn’t affect satellites

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SC seeks Centre’s reply on fresh pleas against CAA

The Supreme Court’s decision to reject the government’s application seeking clarification on administrative allocation of spectrum for non-mobile services is not expected to impact the allocation of satellite spectrum as outlined in the Telecom Bill, according to highly placed sources. In February 2012, the Supreme Court had upheld that auctions were the preferred method for allocating scarce public resources like telecom spectrum.

The Centre had filed a miscellaneous application in December last year seeking a clarification on the matter of administrative allocation of spectrum, which was mentioned in court last week. However, the SC registrar refused to accept the plea, arguing that it was seeking a review of the 2012 order and that there was no ‘reasonable cause’ to entertain it.

Government sources emphasized that this decision would not change the existing laws governing spectrum allocations for satellite communications, as clearly stated in the Telecom Bill. Sources clarified that the application did not seek to amend the 2012 judgment on 2G spectrum allotment nor did it seek permission for administratively allocating spectrum. Spectrum will continue to be auctioned for mobile services, while for the 19 specific use cases cited in the Telecom Bill, it will be allocated administratively.

The government had filed the miscellaneous application at the Supreme Court to explain its intentions before tabling the bill in Parliament, emphasizing that it was not seeking any permission from the court. The application aimed to seek appropriate clarifications from the court regarding the CPIL judgment in 2012, to establish a spectrum assignment framework that includes methods of assignment other than auction in suitable cases, to best serve the common good. In 2012, the SC had criticized the ‘first-come, first served’ method for spectrum allocation, known as the CPIL judgment, and had quashed the 2G spectrum allotted by the United Progressive Alliance government.

Since then, the government has been issuing spectrum administratively in certain cases where auctions are not technically or economically preferred or optimal. The Telecom Bill’s First Schedule lists satellite spectrum and 18 other sectors where administrative allocations will be compulsory, including law enforcement, public broadcasting, in-flight and maritime connectivity, the Indian Army and Coast Guard, and radio backhaul for telecom services. Government sources noted that all stakeholders were consulted on the issue, and the government was confident of its legal standing as outlined in the Telecommunications Act.

The SC, in a presidential reference, did not specify that all spectrum should be auctioned, only that for mobile services. The Supreme Court’s decision not to accept the government’s application seeking clarification on spectrum allocation for non-mobile services does not alter the framework outlined in the Telecom Bill. While auctions remain the preferred method for mobile services, administrative allocations will continue for specific use cases, including satellite spectrum, as delineated in the bill.

The rejection of the application underscores the importance of adherence to established legal procedures and the judiciary’s role in upholding regulatory frameworks. Moving forward, the government remains committed to transparent and efficient spectrum allocation, balancing the imperatives of economic efficiency and public interest in the telecommunications sector.

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Legally Speaking

Legal Victory for Ankiti Bose: Limits Imposed on Defamatory Content Regarding Former Zilingo Chief

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A legal dispute has unfolded involving B2B fashion startup Zilingo, with former CEO Ankiti Bose on one side, and co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya on the opposing side.

A recent court decision in Delhi has brought focus to a legal dispute involving Ankiti Bose, the former CEO of Zilingo, a prominent technology platform. The court issued an ex parte order in Bose’s favor, instructing certain parties, including Zilingo co-founder Dhruv Kapoor and former COO Aadi Vaidya, to refrain from making defamatory statements against Bose. This decision underscores the importance of protecting reputational rights against unfair reporting.

The court’s ruling cited a prima facie case in Bose’s favor, acknowledging her legal right to safeguard her reputation from damaging remarks. It emphasized that failure to act promptly could lead to irreparable harm to Bose’s reputation. The order specifically bars Kapoor and Vaidya from making any further defamatory postings against the former CEO.

This legal action stems from a broader conflict within Zilingo, a B2B fashion startup that has faced financial struggles since its inception in 2015. Bose’s departure from the company was contentious, marked by allegations of misconduct and underperformance. She subsequently filed a First Information Report (FIR) accusing Kapoor and Vaidya of sexual harassment and business irregularities. In response, the accused have dismissed these claims as retaliatory, asserting that Bose’s actions were prompted by her dismissal from the company.

The litigation highlights the complexities of corporate disputes and the broader implications for individuals and businesses. Beyond the legalities, it reflects the challenges faced by startups navigating internal strife amidst financial difficulties. Zilingo’s trajectory, from inception to liquidation, encapsulates the turbulent landscape of the tech industry and underscores the importance of legal protections for individuals like Bose seeking to safeguard their professional standing amidst controversy. The court’s intervention serves as a reminder of the gravity of reputational issues in the modern corporate environment, particularly amidst the complexities of startup dynamics and leadership disputes.

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Legally Speaking

Supreme Court In Patanjali Case: Concerned With All FMCG/Drugs Companies Affecting Lives Of Children And Elderly Through Misleading Ads

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The Supreme Court in the case Indian Medical Association v. Union Of India observed and has clarified against Patanjali over publication of misleading advertisements that it was not dealing with Patanjali as a standalone entity; rather, the Court’s concern, in public interest, extended to all those Fast Moving Consumer Goods, FMCGs or drugs companies which take consumers of their products for a ride through misleading advertisements. The bench comprising of Justice Hima Kohli and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah in its order stated that, this court must clarify that we are not here to gun for a particular party, or a particular agency or a particular authority.

This being the absolute Public Interest Litigation, PIL since it is in the larger interest of the consumers, the public to know which way they are going and how and why they can be misled and how […] is acting to prevent that misuse. Thus, at the end, this is also as we said a part of the process of rule of law. If that is violated, then it affects […].

The court in the case observed that the implementation of laws regulating misleading ads in relation to medicines require deeper examination, as the products are used for babies, school going children and senior citizens based on the ads: Further, the court stated that this court is of the opinion that the issue which relates to implementation of the relevant provisions of the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act and the Rules, the Drugs and Cosmetic Act and the Rules, and the Consumers Act and the relevant Rules needs closer examination in the light of the grievances raised by the petitioner…not just limited to the respondents before this court but to all similarly situated or placed FMCGs who have […] misleading advertisements, and taking the public for a ride…affecting the health of babies, school going children and senior citizens who have been consuming products on the basis of the said misrepresentation.

The court while taking into account the misleading ads issued in electronic media impleaded the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Information Technology, and Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Therefore, the same was being done with a view to examine the steps taken by these Ministries to prevent abuse of Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act 1954 (and the Rules), the Drugs and Cosmetic Act 1940 (and Rules) and the Consumer Protection Act. Accordingly, the court listed the matter for further consideration on May 07, 2024.

Background Of The Case:

The Court raps Uttarakhand authorities The said court also came down heavily on the State of Uttarakhand for the failure of its licensing authorities to take legal action against Patanjali and its subsidiary Divya Pharmacy. The bench also asked why it should not think that the authorities were ‘hand in glove’ with Patanjali or Divya Pharmacy.

The court in its order stated that it was ‘appalled’ to note that apart from ‘pushing the file’, the State Licensing Authorities did nothing and were merely trying to ‘pass on the buck’ to ‘somehow delay the matter.’ The court stated that the State Licensing Authority is “equally complicit” due to its inaction against Divya Pharmacy despite having information about t heir advertisements violating the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act.

Further, the court stated that it was refraining from issuing contempt notices to other officers. Further, the court directed that all officers holding the post of Joint Director of the State Licensing Authority, Haridwar between 2018 till date shall also file affidavits explaining inaction on their part.

Background of the Case:

The contempt case was initiated wherein the petition is filed by the Indian Medical Association against Patanjali’s advertisements attacking allopathy and making claims about curing certain diseases. On the Supreme Court reprimand, the Patanjali on last November had assured that it would refrain from such advertisements. The court in the case noted that the misleading advertisements continued, thus, the Court had issued contempt notice to Patanjali and its MD in February.

The court in march considering that reply to the contempt notice was not filed, the personal appearance of the Patanjali MD as well as Baba Ramdev, who featured in the press conferences and advertisements published after the undertaking, was ordered by the said Court. Therefore, the Patanjali MD filed an affidavit wherein it is stated that the impugned advertisements were meant to contain only general statements but inadvertently included offending sentences. Further, the court stated that the advertisements were bona-fide and that Patanjali’s media personnel was not ‘cognizant’ of the November order (wherein the undertaking was given before the Supreme Court).

The affidavit filed also contained an averment that the Drugs and Magic Remedies Act was in an “archaic state” as it was enacted at a time when scientific evidence regarding Ayurvedic medicines was lacking. On the last date of hearing, both Baba Ramdev and MD Balkrishna were physically present in Court. The court expressed its reservations about MD Balkrishna’s affidavit, calling it “perfunctory” and “mere lip service”. The court gave last opportunity to the alleged contemnors for filing a proper affidavit.

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