The Unresolved Issue of AMP Expenses in Transfer Pricing – India - Business Guardian
Connect with us

Legally Speaking

The Unresolved Issue of AMP Expenses in Transfer Pricing – India

Published

on

One of the most perplexing yet significant concepts within the Transfer Pricing Dispute Resolution is with regards to the Advertisement, Marking and Promoting (AMP) Expenses that are drawn by the Indian Entities of a company for the products of its foreign Associate Entity. This concept has been surrounded by controversy and confusion since its inception within the practice and study of Transfer Pricing and this is because of the absence of any statutes or regulations dealing with it and its jurisprudence is built purely on the judicial precedents that have been delivered by the Tribunals and High Courts, however, interestingly even the courts appear to have a tough time dealing with issues pertaining to AMP expenses.

The origin of this dispute can be traced back to the United States Tax Court in the case of United States v. DHL Corporation, after the introduction of the US Regulations of 1968 which introduced an important concept pertaining to “Developer Assister Rules” as per which the entity which has incurred the AMP Expenses (Developer) would be treated as the economic owner of the brand which is being marketed even though it might not be its legal owner, and the legal owner of the Brand i.e., the Assister need not pay any compensation for the use of the brand by the developer. These regulations were grounded on the notion of equitable ownership of a brand on the basis of the fiscal expenditure and the risk incurred by them, and the legal ownership of the brand has not to be taken as one of the criteria for ascertaining who would be considered as the developer of the Brand or the intangible property in question.

However, it is pertinent to consider that the Transfer Pricing Rules in America create a clear distinction between “Routine” and “Non-Routine” expenditure, which is essential to understand the issue of the monetary remuneration that is given to the domestic associated entity for marketing intangibles. In DHL, the court framed the Bright Line Test (BLT) which created a distinction between the routine and non-routine expenses that were incurred by the companies. According to the Bright Line Test, it is necessary to ascertain the non-routine expenses that have been incurred i.e., for marketing purposes in contrast to the routine expenses that the incurred by the brand’s distributor for product promotion while ascertaining the economic ownership of the intangible in question.

The issue pertaining to AMP expenses was first dealt with in the case of Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax [(2010) 328 ITR 210] before the Delhi High Court, where the Bench held that the Advertisement, Marketing and Promoting Expenses will be considered as an international transaction only in cases where it exceeds the costs and expenses that have been incurred by comparable domestic entities which are similarly situated. However, the Delhi High Court’s judgement was remanded following which it was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court in Maruti Suzuki v. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax [2011] 335 ITR 121 (SC) where it was overturned by the Apex Court.

In LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. v Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [(2013) 140 ITD 41 (Delhi) (SB)], the Delhi Bench of the ITAT referred to the precedent by the Delhi High Court in Maruti Suzuki and held that the as per Chapter X of the Income Tax Act, 1961 the Assessing Officer has the right to make an adjustment for Transfer Pricing vide application of the Bright Line Test in issues pertaining to the AMP expenses that have been drawn by the Indian Entity, since this would fall within the ambit of an international transaction, and this would be deduced from the proportionally higher AMP expenses that were incurred by the Domestic Entity in contrast to two similarly situated domestic entities. The Revenue’s understanding that the AMP expenses which are incurred by the Domestic Associated Entity will inevitably result in a benefit to the Foreign Associated Entity in terms of increasing its brand value along with the lack of lack adequate compensation to the latter for the same, is the primary reason behind its attempt to bring all expenses pertaining to advertising, marketing and promotion within the ambit of the country’s Transfer Pricing Laws, thus it takes the job of applying an Arm’s Length Prince on such transactions which are used for AMP and the test that is most widely employed for this purpose is the Bright Line Test which used by the court in the case of LG Electronics, where it looked at the Bright Line, which is a line drawn within the total expenditure for the purposes of AMP which signified the average spending for the same purpose by comparable entities and any amount which would exceed the line would be considered as an international transaction which would represent the expenses that were drawn by the domestic entity for the building the brand value of the Foreign Associated Entity’s product.

The precedent in Sony Ericsson proved to be a gamechanger wherein the court went to the extent of overruling all of the abovementioned judgements with regards to whether AMP Expenses by the Domestic Entity would be considered as an internal transaction. In this case, the court did not face any issues in determining whether it would constitute an international transaction since the entities had submitted that the international between the Foreign Associated Entity and the Domestic Entity also included the money for the purposes of AMP. While the Revenue had relied on the precedent in LG Electronics to show cause for their application of the Bright Line Test in determining the part of the expenses towards AMP that would be considered as an international transaction. However, the court reject the Revenue’s submissions and reasoning while holding that the Bright Line Test did not have legislative or statutory backing and thus the precedent in LG Electronics was overruled with regards to the use and applicability of the Bright Line Test for ascertaining international transactions since this would be considered as an outcome of judicial legislation.

After the precedent in Sony Ericsson there has been a drastic change in the judicial approach towards issues pertaining to AMP expenses within the realm of transfer pricing. However, since the Court has failed to elaborate upon what would constitute an international transaction in Sony Ericsson, the courts and tribunals have gone back to the phase of drowning in confusion to deal with cases pertaining to AMP expenses and have struggled with determining a proper method for the same.

A transfer pricing adjustment can only be made when it has met the statutory framework of highlighting the existence of an international transaction, determination of the price and fixing an ALP in compliance with Section 92 C of the Income Tax Act. While the element of the international transaction was not disputed in all of the aforementioned cases, the primary issue was with regards what would constitute an international a transaction. The definition of an international transaction as per the Income Tax Act includes the parties to have an agreement between themselves for such a transaction and a shared understanding with regards to the transaction and its purpose. In LG Electronics and other cases prior to Sony Ericson, the primary criteria that were adopted by the courted in ascertaining international transactions and unsaid understanding, were on the basis of proportionally higher expenses with reference to comparable i.e. the courts had adopted the Bright Line Test which had been deemed incompatible with the Income Tax Act of 1961

At a glance at most of the cases pertaining to this issue, the Revenue has resorted to proving the existence of international transactions on the basis of the Bright Line Test, and most of the revenue’s judgements also fail to highlight or prove the same, otherwise except for the unique cases in which the Assessee Domestic Associated Entity and the Foreign Associated Entity had a written agreement between the two of them. This issue is purely because of the lack of any regulatory or statutory provisions within the Income Tax Act, and this was also brought to attention by the court in Maruti Suzuki(2011). In the absence of Statutory provisions and the inability to apply the Bright Line Test because of the precedent in Sony Ericsson, it becomes impossible for the revenue in such cases, especially in the absence of a written or express agreement between the Domestic and Foreign Associated Entities, where it is forced to assess the Domestic Entity’s subjective intentions however this method was also rejected in Maruti Suzuki(2011).

While the decision in Sony Ericsson has left the Revenue and Courts baffled with regards to the method, they should use to ascertain international transactions in matters pertaining to AMP expenses, hopefully, this will finally come to a conclusion since it is currently being heard by the Country’s Apex Court. It is of the utmost importance for the Apex Court to elaborate upon the method and procedure that must be followed by the revenue in determining cases pertaining AMP expenses and issue guidelines for the same.

The origin of this dispute can be traced back to the United States Tax Court in the case of United States v. DHL Corporation, after the introduction of the US Regulations of 1968 which introduced an important concept pertaining to “Developer Assister Rules” as per which the entity which has incurred the AMP Expenses (Developer) would be treated as the economic owner of the brand which is being marketed even though it might not be its legal owner, and the legal owner of the Brand i.e., the Assister need not pay any compensation for the use of the brand by the developer. These regulations were grounded on the notion of equitable ownership of a brand on the basis of the fiscal expenditure and the risk incurred by them, and the legal ownership of the brand has not to be taken as one of the criteria for ascertaining who would be considered as the developer of the Brand or the intangible property in question.

The Daily Guardian is now on Telegram. Click here to join our channel (@thedailyguardian) and stay updated with the latest headlines.

For the latest news Download The Daily Guardian App.

Legally Speaking

Disproportionate assets case: Delhi High Court stays Lokpal proceedings initiated against Jharkhand Mukti Morcha chief Shibu Soren

Published

on

Disproportionate assets case: Delhi High Court stays Lokpal proceedings initiated against Jharkhand Mukti Morcha chief Shibu Soren

On Monday, the Delhi High Court has stayed the proceedings initiated by Lokpal of India under the provisions of the Lokpal & Lokayuktas Act, 2013 against Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) Chief and Rajya Sabha MP Shibu Soren in connection with a disproportionate case of assets.

The bench comprising of Justice Yashwant Varma observed and has passed an order on Soren’s plea challenging the validity of the said proceedings, claiming that the same was ex facie bad in law and without jurisdiction.

In the present case, the proceedings were initiated by Lokpal of India pursuant to a complaint dated August 5, 2020 filed by BJP’s Nishikant Dubey. Therefore, it has been directed by the CBI to make a preliminary enquiry into the Complaint under section 20(1)(a) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013. It was claimed by Soren that the said order was not served on him.

While claiming the complaint was false, frivolous and vexatious, Soren in his plea submitted that according to section 53 of the Act and there is a statutory bar against the Lokpal of India assuming jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into any Complaint made after the expiry of seven years from the offence alleged.

The plea reads that the initiation of the proceedings under the Complaint, or at the very least, continuation thereof, once it has been demonstrated by the preliminary inquiry that it pertains to alleged acquisitions prior to the 7-year period and is clearly barred by statute, without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed.

Further, the petition filled submits that the maximum period of 180 days for completion of preliminary enquiry from the date of Complaint expired on February 1, 2021. In this backdrop, it has been stated that by this time, only on July 1, 2021, the comments were sought from Soren which is beyond the prescribed statutory period.

The plea adds that the final preliminary enquiry report was submitted by the CBI on 29.06.2022, about a year and a half after expiry of the 180- day period. Such purported report is void and null and non-est in the eyes of law and cannot be received or considered by the Respondent No.1.

Thus, the court took note of the order passed by Lokpal of India dated August 4, 2022 directing that proceedings under section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act be initiated to determine whether a prima facie case existed to be proceeded against Soren. It is Soren’s case that the order was passed without considering the preliminary objection on jurisdiction being raised by him.

In the said order, the court noted that all the Lokpal of India recorded was that the comments received from the petitioner were forwarded to CBI so as to examine and submit an enquiry report.

It was ordered by the court that the challenge to assumption of jurisdiction by respondent no. 1 (the Lokpal of India) has neither been answered and nor dealt with. Matters require consideration. Subsequently, there will be a stay of proceedings pending before the Lokayukta.

Accordingly, the court will now hear the matter on 14 December.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

DELHI HC SETS ASIDE MURDER CONVICTION & LIFE SENTENCE OF MAN WHO WAS UNPRESENTED BY LAWYER; REMANDS CASTE BACK TO TRIAL COURT

Published

on

DELHI HC SETS ASIDE MURDER CONVICTION & LIFE SENTENCE OF MAN WHO WAS UNPRESENTED BY LAWYER; REMANDS CASTE BACK TO TRIAL COURT

The Delhi High Court in the case Narender @ Lala v. State Of NCT Of Delhi observed and has set aside the orders of conviction for murder and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to a man in 2018 who was unrepresented by a lawyer before the Trial Court. Thus, the Delhi High Court has remanded the case back to the Trial Court for cross examination of certain prosecution witnesses.

The division bench comprising of Justice Mukta Gupta and Justice Anish Dayal observed and was of the view that there had been a grave miscarriage of justice to the man as when number of witnesses were examined, he was not represented by a counsel and that the legal aid counsel, who was present before Trial Court and was appointed on the same day and asked to cross- examine the witnesses on the same day.

On March, 2018, Narender was convicted for offence of murder punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. On 4th May, 2018, he was sentenced by the Trial Court for life imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000.

In the present case, the case of the prosecution was that the man had committed murder of his wife by strangulating her to death.

In a appeal, it was argued by the man that during the substantial course of trial, he was not represented by a lawyer and hence the trial in the absence of a lawyer had seriously prejudiced him. He thus sought recalling of all the prosecution witnesses and thereby ensuring a fair trial.

The Court observed that the manner in which the trial is conducted, there was a serious denial of fair trial to the appellant and the appellant is required to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses i.e., the witnesses examined in the absence of the lawyer, or the lawyer having been appointed on the same day from the legal aid and is asked to cross-examine the witnesses.

Further, the court remanded the back to Trial Court for cross-examination of ten prosecution witnesses. Also, the court directed the Trial Court Judge to follow due process of law and also to record the statement of the man under Section 313 CrPC and permit leading the defence evidence if so required.

The Court ordered that the case be listed before the learned Trial Court on 26th September, when Superintendent Tihar Jail will product the appellant before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court is requested to expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within four months.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO ENTERTAIN PLEA CHALLENGING EXCLUSION OF SC/ST RESERVATION IN JHARKHAND DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTMENT

Published

on

SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO ENTERTAIN PLEA CHALLENGING EXCLUSION OF SC/ST RESERVATION IN JHARKHAND DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTMENT

The Supreme Court in the case Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Educational And Cultural Trust v. Hon’ble High Court Jharkhand And Ors. observed and has refused to entertain a plea challenging the non-inclusion of reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes communities in the process of appointment of District Judges in pursuant to an advertisement issued in March, 2022 by the High Court of Jharkhand. The present petition claimed that the exclusion of reservation violates Jharkhand State Reservation Policy and constitutional guarantee under Article 16(4). Apart from this, it is also in derogation of a resolution being passed by the High Court vouching to implement reservation in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service.

The bench comprising of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and the Justice Hima Kohli observed and has granted liberty to the petitioner to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Jharkhand High Court.

The court while considering that the process of appointment as per the concerned notification is underway, Justice Chandrachud asked the petitioner to approach the High Court with respect to future appointments.

It stated that “For the future you can file a petition before the High Court… We will give you liberty to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

The bench of Justice Chandrachud observed that the Decisions of the Administrative side of the High Court can be challenged before the judicial side of the High Court. You can move the High Court.

In the present case, a writ petition challenging a similar notification was filed in 2017 before the High Court, which was eventually dismissed. It was observed by the High Court that there is no duty vested in the authorities to reserve seats for all posts, more particularly in higher judiciary. Moreover, it had already initiated the appointment process, the High Court opined that it cannot alter the rules midway. Thus, the appeal filed before the Apex Court was also dismissed.

However, in 2018 the Full Court of the Jharkhand High Court had agreed in principle to grant reservation in the recruitment for Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The advocates belonging to the SC/ST/OBC communities in 2021 had made representations to the Chief Justice of the High Court requesting for the implementation of the Reservation policy in appointment of District Judges (direct entry from Bar)/ superior judicial service. The impugned notification was issued without incorporating reservation for SC/ST/OBC communities in March 2022.

Mr. Arvind Gupta, Advocate on Record has filled the present petition.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

Right to contest election is not a fundamental right; it is only a right conferred by statute: Supreme Court

Published

on

Don’t compare Turban, Kirpan with Hijab: SC

The Supreme Court in the case Vishwanath Pratap Singh vs Election Commission of India observed that the right to contest an election is not a fundamental right but only a right conferred by a statute.

The bench comprising of Justice Hemant Gupta and the Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia observed while dismissing a Special Leave Petition filed by Vishwanath Pratap Singh that an individual cannot claim that he has a right to contest election and the said stipulation violates his fundamental right, so as is required under the Act, to file his nomination without any proposer.

Also, the court imposed a cost of Rupees one lakh on Singh.

In the present case, Singh had first approached the Delhi High Court challenging a notification issued by Election Commission of India for election to Rajya Sabha after he was not allowed to file his nomination without a proper proposer being proposing his name. His contentions were rejected by the High Court that his fundamental right of free speech and expression and right to personal liberty has been infringed.

While dismissing the SLP, the Apex Court observed that the writ petition before the High Court was entirely misconceived.

The bench observed while referring to earlier judgments viz Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 and Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 2 SCC 445 wherein it was stated that the right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is a right conferred by a statute.

However, the Supreme Court in Javed (supra) had made the following observations: Right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right and it is a right conferred by a statute. At the most, in view of Part IX having been added in the Constitution of India that a right to contest election for an office in Panchayat may be said to be a constitutional right and a right originating in the Constitution and given shape by a statute. But even if, it cannot be equated with a fundamental right. It is stated that there is nothing wrong in the same statute which confers the right to contest an election also to provide for the necessary qualifications without which a person cannot offer his candidature for an elective office and also to provide for disqualifications which would disable a person from contesting for, or from holding, an elective statutory office.

It was held in Rajbala (supra) that the right to contest for a seat in either of the two bodies is subject to certain constitutional restrictions and could be restricted further only by a law which the parliament made.

Further, the court added that Singh did not have any right to contest election to the Rajya Sabha in terms of the law made by the Parliament.

The Court stated while dismissing the SLP that the Representation of People Act, 1950 read with the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 has contemplated the name of a candidate to be proposed while filling the nomination form. However, it cannot be claimed by an individual that he has a right to contest election and the said stipulation violates his fundamental right, so as to file his nomination without any proposer as is required under the Act.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

Post-conviction compounding of offences is permissible: Himachal Pradesh High Court

Published

on

The Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case Shri Kantu Ram v Shri Beer Singh recently observed that a court, while exercising powers under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and can proceed to compound the offences even after recording of conviction by the courts below.

The bench comprising of Justice Sandeep Sharma observed in a case where the revision Petitioner, who was convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act by the Magistrate Court and was aggrieved by subsequent dismissal of appeal by the Sessions Court and had agreed to pay the amount due and settle the matter.

Thus, the petitioner had sought compounding of offences.

In the present case, the respondent admitted the factum with regard to receipt of the amount due from the accused and expressed that the prayer made on behalf of accused for compounding of offence can be accepted.

However, the High Court allowed the prayer and the offence committed by the Petitioner under Section 138 NI Act was ordered to be compounded.

The Court observed that the Reliance was placed on Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663, wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that court, while exercising power under Section 147 of the NI Act and can proceed to compound the offence even after recording of the conviction by the courts below.

Continue Reading

Legally Speaking

‘Pensionary benefits to employee, who is removed from service for misconduct, is not at par with those who retire on superannuation’

Published

on

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court in the case Bashir Ahmad Wani v Jammu and Kashmir Grameen Bank and Another recently observed and stated that an employee who is removed from service for misconduct is not at par with those who is being retired on superannuation.

The bench comprising of Justice Sanjeev Kumar observed while dismissing the pension claim made by a former employee of the J&K Grameen Bank, who was removed from service in 2011.

In the present case, the petitioner had sought benefit of the J&K Grameen Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 2018 whereby provision was made for terminal benefits.

However, the court disallowed the claims on two grounds:

Firstly, that at the time of removal of the petitioner from service when there were no norms, rules or regulations providing for the benefit of pension to the employees of the respondent-Bank.

In the year 2011, the employees of the respondent-Bank were governed by the J&K Grameen Bank ( the Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010… it is abundantly clear that it does not prescribe imposition of a penalty of removal along with the pensionary benefits.

Secondly, it was opined by the court that though the 2018 Regulations had been made applicable to those employees who were in service between 1st day of September, 1987 and 31st day of March, 2010 and the employees retired from the services of the Bank before 31st day of March, 2018, however, this leeway cannot come to aid of the Petitioner.

The Curt observed that the reason for finding that the Petitioner was not an employee who had “retired” on superannuation from the bank. Rather, he was “removed” for misconduct.

The Court stated that the regulations apply to those employees who retired from the service of the Bank before 31.03.2018 and not the employees who were terminated for misconduct. Viewed thus, the order of removal of the petitioner dated 02.09.2011 holding the petitioner entitled to terminable benefits and cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be construed to be an order of removal with the benefit of the pension. Neither, the petitioner, at the time of his removal from service, nor with the promulgation of Pension Regulations of 2018, is entitled to the benefit of pension.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.

Continue Reading

Trending