Present generation taking concept of marriage very lightly, they apply for divorce on unimaginable trivial issues: Madras HC - Business Guardian
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Present generation taking concept of marriage very lightly, they apply for divorce on unimaginable trivial issues: Madras HC

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It has to be taken most seriously that none other than the Madras High Court which is one of the oldest High Courts in India has taken most serious note of the present generation taking concept of marriage very lightly and they apply for divorce on unimaginable trivial issues and marriage is broken. This clearly reflects that the tolerance level in the present generation is decreasing very rapidly. The present generation can only at its own peril prefer to ignore what the Madras High Court has ruled in this notable case.

To start with, this leading, latest, learned and laudable judgment titled Annapoorani Vs. S. Ritesh in C.R.P.No. 106 of 2021 and C.M.P. No. 995 of 2021 authored by a Single Judge Bench of Justice V Bhavani Subbaroyan of the Madras High Court sets the ball rolling in para 1 wherein it is put forth that, “The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article 227 Constitution of India with the prayer to strike off the petition in O.P. 4784 of 2019 on the file of III Additional Family Court, Chennai on the ground that the invocation of Section 12(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is not sustainable by raising various grounds.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then points out in para 2 that, “The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the wife as against the petition in O.P.No.4784 of 2019 filed by the respondent / husband before the said Family Court. The respondent / husband has filed the Original Petition before the Family Court against the petitioner / wife herein on the ground that the respondent / wife is suffering from Polycystic Ovarian Syndrome (for brevity ‘PSOS’) and the respondent / wife was not fit for cohabitation or give birth to a child. Apart from that, he has also raised many other issues, instances as against the wife for seeking declaration declaring that the marriage solemnized on 01.07.2018, which was subsequently registered on the same day, vide Sl.No.95 of 2018 before the Marriage Registrar, Joint II, Saidapet, Chennai – 15, as null and void. After filing this petition, the respondent / husband has also filed an I.A. 1 of 2020 seeking for an amendment to include the provision of law from 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(a) and (c). The said petition seeking for amendment is pending before the Family Court for decision.”

Needless to say, the Bench then also mentions in para 5 that, “Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in length and perused the materials available on record.”

As it turned out, the Bench then points out in para 6 that, “It is to be noted that the petitioner herein had approached this Court seeking to strike off the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on the alleged facts which are pleaded in O.P.No.4784 of 2019 before the Family Court, Chennai . She also claims that she wedded to the respondent / husband on 01.07.2018, as per the Hindu Marriage Act and the same is the arranged marriage; arranged by the parents, elders and well-wishers of both the parties. However, the said marriage did not last long on the alleged ground of physical condition that the petitioner / wife cannot give birth to a child, as alleged by the husband, owing to ‘PSOS’ on the part of the wife.”

Be it noted, the Bench then mentions in para 7 that, “On a careful perusal of the said petition filed before the Family Court, Chennai, it is seen that the respondent . husband has narrated various facts apart from the issue of ‘PSOS’ which he relies most as a ground for seeking divorce. It is also seen that the respondent / husband has made categorical allegation that the petitioner / wife is suffering from ‘PSOS’ due to which’ her menstrual cycle will extend for more than 25 days and she is under mediation ever since the date of puberty.”

It is also worth noting that it is then pointed out in para 8 that, “The issue of ‘PSOS’, which is now commonly prevailing among the present generation of women due to various habits, such as, mental stress and to a very great extent, the contaminated environment, in which we live, is also one of the cause for particular women, who develop this physical problem. The term ‘PSOS’ by itself cannot be termed as ‘impotency’. Impotency is different and unable to give birth to a child is different, owing to various physical and mental reasons.”

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Most remarkably, what forms the cornerstone of this leading judgment is then enunciated in para 9 wherein it is held that, “On a careful perusal of the entire pleadings in a petition filed by the respondent / husband, it is clear that he has not pleaded that the wife’s inability to give birth to a child as ‘Impotency’, but he seeks for annulment of a marriage on the reason that there was no cohabitation and wife could not bear a child. In fact, he has also pleaded that the wife has not cooperated for cohabitation owing to her medical condition, as she was almost 25 days on her menstrual cycle. The marriage being a bondage between men and women as husband and wife, it not only limits to a biological needs and desires, but also as a companion in life caring forward to the next generation through their children. This bondage is a factor, through which, we are living in this world for centuries. However, the concept of marriage in the present generation are taken very lightly and even for trivial issues, they file divorce and marriage is broken. That is why the Family Courts increase in numbers to cater the demand of intolerant couple, who are unmindful of the institution of marriage, break the relationship on unimaginable trivial reasons.”

In the present context in this notable case, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “As far as the present case on hand is concerned, on going through the entire pleadings it is clear that the respondent / husband has not spelt out any single word connoting impotency towards his wife/ petitioner herein. But he has approached the Family Court mainly on the issue complaining that his wife/ petitioner herein could not bear a child on two reasons, viz., firstly, there is no cohabitation, secondly, the wife is suffering from ‘PSOS’ due to which the said wife suffer a improper menstrual cycle. At this stage of the case, the petiitoner / wife has filed the present Civil Revision Petition, who has not filed any counter to the said allegation.

For the sake of clarity, the Bench then makes it a point to clarify in para 11 stating that, “With regard to invocation of Article 227 of Constitution of India is concerned, it is only a supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court on its Subordinate Courts and in several cases, Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court have confirmed that when the suit filed on frivolous fact and when there is an abuse of process of law, the court can extend its power strictly and if on plain reading of the plaint, it shows abuse of process of law, the court can intervene. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked only when there is manifest error committed by the Subordinate court and the said arguments of the petitioner’s counsel does not come under the said reason and the same will not fall under realm of exercising the power under Article 227 Constitution of India, as the respondent / husband contrary to the submissions made by the learned counsel petitioner, has not made any allegation in the petition with regard to the impotency of the petitioner / wife.”

What’s more, it is then pertinently mentioned which is quite ostensible also in para 12 that, “It is a legitimate expectation of the husband to live with his wife and have cohabitation and bear children and if the same is not achieved owing to any physical and mental problem among the partners, it is quite logical that either of the parties will approach the court for seeking divorce on such allegations. Except in few cases, where the couple understand each other and come forward with the life issue-less or even go for adoption, however, the same has to be proved by the person claiming that his or her partner is incapacitated to give or bear the child. But in the case on hand, the petitioner is not in a position to show that there is no cause of action disclosed by the averments made in the petition filed by the husband/respondent or that the cause of action disclosed by the averments made in the petition is not natural, but illusive.”

Finally, it is then held in the final para 13 that, “Under these circumstances, it could be seen that the petitioner has not made out any grounds seeking for intervention of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to strike off the petition in O.P.No.4784 of 2019 on the file of III Additional Family Court, Chennai. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition does not even merit admission and the same is liable to be dismissed at the threshold and the same is dismissed. The learned III Additional Judge, Family Court, Chennai shall proceed on merit in the said H.M.O.P.No.4784 of 2019 uninfluenced by the observations made by this Court in the present Civil Revision Petition. In the result, the present Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed. No costs.”

To conclude, it is high time and the present generation must at least now wake up their ideas and adhere to what the Madras High Court has said in totality. They must learn to be more tolerant towards each other as had been the case in the earlier generations and stop applying for divorce on unimaginable trivial issues as has been very rightly pointed out also by the Madras High Court in this notable case also. Only then will they be able to live a happy and peaceful life. What is the harm in doing so? Why start fuming in anger over very trivial issues and then foolishly going in for litigation which hurts both the parties as both have to spend money on hiring lawyers and other expenses! They will themselves stand to gain the most if they prefer to do so as has been very commendably suggested by the Madras High Court in this leading case. Justice V Bhavani Subbaroyan of the Madras High Court who is herself a woman and who has delivered this brief, balanced and brilliant judgment has set the record straight on this and it is the bounden duty of the present generation to pay heed to what she has said in her commendable and noteworthy judgment which is being widely appreciated also! Let’s fervently hope that they do so accordingly!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,

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Disproportionate assets case: Delhi High Court stays Lokpal proceedings initiated against Jharkhand Mukti Morcha chief Shibu Soren

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Disproportionate assets case: Delhi High Court stays Lokpal proceedings initiated against Jharkhand Mukti Morcha chief Shibu Soren

On Monday, the Delhi High Court has stayed the proceedings initiated by Lokpal of India under the provisions of the Lokpal & Lokayuktas Act, 2013 against Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) Chief and Rajya Sabha MP Shibu Soren in connection with a disproportionate case of assets.

The bench comprising of Justice Yashwant Varma observed and has passed an order on Soren’s plea challenging the validity of the said proceedings, claiming that the same was ex facie bad in law and without jurisdiction.

In the present case, the proceedings were initiated by Lokpal of India pursuant to a complaint dated August 5, 2020 filed by BJP’s Nishikant Dubey. Therefore, it has been directed by the CBI to make a preliminary enquiry into the Complaint under section 20(1)(a) of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013. It was claimed by Soren that the said order was not served on him.

While claiming the complaint was false, frivolous and vexatious, Soren in his plea submitted that according to section 53 of the Act and there is a statutory bar against the Lokpal of India assuming jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into any Complaint made after the expiry of seven years from the offence alleged.

The plea reads that the initiation of the proceedings under the Complaint, or at the very least, continuation thereof, once it has been demonstrated by the preliminary inquiry that it pertains to alleged acquisitions prior to the 7-year period and is clearly barred by statute, without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed.

Further, the petition filled submits that the maximum period of 180 days for completion of preliminary enquiry from the date of Complaint expired on February 1, 2021. In this backdrop, it has been stated that by this time, only on July 1, 2021, the comments were sought from Soren which is beyond the prescribed statutory period.

The plea adds that the final preliminary enquiry report was submitted by the CBI on 29.06.2022, about a year and a half after expiry of the 180- day period. Such purported report is void and null and non-est in the eyes of law and cannot be received or considered by the Respondent No.1.

Thus, the court took note of the order passed by Lokpal of India dated August 4, 2022 directing that proceedings under section 20(3) of the Lokpal Act be initiated to determine whether a prima facie case existed to be proceeded against Soren. It is Soren’s case that the order was passed without considering the preliminary objection on jurisdiction being raised by him.

In the said order, the court noted that all the Lokpal of India recorded was that the comments received from the petitioner were forwarded to CBI so as to examine and submit an enquiry report.

It was ordered by the court that the challenge to assumption of jurisdiction by respondent no. 1 (the Lokpal of India) has neither been answered and nor dealt with. Matters require consideration. Subsequently, there will be a stay of proceedings pending before the Lokayukta.

Accordingly, the court will now hear the matter on 14 December.

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DELHI HC SETS ASIDE MURDER CONVICTION & LIFE SENTENCE OF MAN WHO WAS UNPRESENTED BY LAWYER; REMANDS CASTE BACK TO TRIAL COURT

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DELHI HC SETS ASIDE MURDER CONVICTION & LIFE SENTENCE OF MAN WHO WAS UNPRESENTED BY LAWYER; REMANDS CASTE BACK TO TRIAL COURT

The Delhi High Court in the case Narender @ Lala v. State Of NCT Of Delhi observed and has set aside the orders of conviction for murder and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to a man in 2018 who was unrepresented by a lawyer before the Trial Court. Thus, the Delhi High Court has remanded the case back to the Trial Court for cross examination of certain prosecution witnesses.

The division bench comprising of Justice Mukta Gupta and Justice Anish Dayal observed and was of the view that there had been a grave miscarriage of justice to the man as when number of witnesses were examined, he was not represented by a counsel and that the legal aid counsel, who was present before Trial Court and was appointed on the same day and asked to cross- examine the witnesses on the same day.

On March, 2018, Narender was convicted for offence of murder punishable under section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. On 4th May, 2018, he was sentenced by the Trial Court for life imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000.

In the present case, the case of the prosecution was that the man had committed murder of his wife by strangulating her to death.

In a appeal, it was argued by the man that during the substantial course of trial, he was not represented by a lawyer and hence the trial in the absence of a lawyer had seriously prejudiced him. He thus sought recalling of all the prosecution witnesses and thereby ensuring a fair trial.

The Court observed that the manner in which the trial is conducted, there was a serious denial of fair trial to the appellant and the appellant is required to be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses i.e., the witnesses examined in the absence of the lawyer, or the lawyer having been appointed on the same day from the legal aid and is asked to cross-examine the witnesses.

Further, the court remanded the back to Trial Court for cross-examination of ten prosecution witnesses. Also, the court directed the Trial Court Judge to follow due process of law and also to record the statement of the man under Section 313 CrPC and permit leading the defence evidence if so required.

The Court ordered that the case be listed before the learned Trial Court on 26th September, when Superintendent Tihar Jail will product the appellant before the learned Trial Court and the learned Trial Court is requested to expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably within four months.

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SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO ENTERTAIN PLEA CHALLENGING EXCLUSION OF SC/ST RESERVATION IN JHARKHAND DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTMENT

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SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO ENTERTAIN PLEA CHALLENGING EXCLUSION OF SC/ST RESERVATION IN JHARKHAND DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTMENT

The Supreme Court in the case Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Educational And Cultural Trust v. Hon’ble High Court Jharkhand And Ors. observed and has refused to entertain a plea challenging the non-inclusion of reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes communities in the process of appointment of District Judges in pursuant to an advertisement issued in March, 2022 by the High Court of Jharkhand. The present petition claimed that the exclusion of reservation violates Jharkhand State Reservation Policy and constitutional guarantee under Article 16(4). Apart from this, it is also in derogation of a resolution being passed by the High Court vouching to implement reservation in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service.

The bench comprising of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and the Justice Hima Kohli observed and has granted liberty to the petitioner to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Jharkhand High Court.

The court while considering that the process of appointment as per the concerned notification is underway, Justice Chandrachud asked the petitioner to approach the High Court with respect to future appointments.

It stated that “For the future you can file a petition before the High Court… We will give you liberty to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

The bench of Justice Chandrachud observed that the Decisions of the Administrative side of the High Court can be challenged before the judicial side of the High Court. You can move the High Court.

In the present case, a writ petition challenging a similar notification was filed in 2017 before the High Court, which was eventually dismissed. It was observed by the High Court that there is no duty vested in the authorities to reserve seats for all posts, more particularly in higher judiciary. Moreover, it had already initiated the appointment process, the High Court opined that it cannot alter the rules midway. Thus, the appeal filed before the Apex Court was also dismissed.

However, in 2018 the Full Court of the Jharkhand High Court had agreed in principle to grant reservation in the recruitment for Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The advocates belonging to the SC/ST/OBC communities in 2021 had made representations to the Chief Justice of the High Court requesting for the implementation of the Reservation policy in appointment of District Judges (direct entry from Bar)/ superior judicial service. The impugned notification was issued without incorporating reservation for SC/ST/OBC communities in March 2022.

Mr. Arvind Gupta, Advocate on Record has filled the present petition.

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Right to contest election is not a fundamental right; it is only a right conferred by statute: Supreme Court

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Don’t compare Turban, Kirpan with Hijab: SC

The Supreme Court in the case Vishwanath Pratap Singh vs Election Commission of India observed that the right to contest an election is not a fundamental right but only a right conferred by a statute.

The bench comprising of Justice Hemant Gupta and the Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia observed while dismissing a Special Leave Petition filed by Vishwanath Pratap Singh that an individual cannot claim that he has a right to contest election and the said stipulation violates his fundamental right, so as is required under the Act, to file his nomination without any proposer.

Also, the court imposed a cost of Rupees one lakh on Singh.

In the present case, Singh had first approached the Delhi High Court challenging a notification issued by Election Commission of India for election to Rajya Sabha after he was not allowed to file his nomination without a proper proposer being proposing his name. His contentions were rejected by the High Court that his fundamental right of free speech and expression and right to personal liberty has been infringed.

While dismissing the SLP, the Apex Court observed that the writ petition before the High Court was entirely misconceived.

The bench observed while referring to earlier judgments viz Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 and Rajbala v. State of Haryana (2016) 2 SCC 445 wherein it was stated that the right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is a right conferred by a statute.

However, the Supreme Court in Javed (supra) had made the following observations: Right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right and it is a right conferred by a statute. At the most, in view of Part IX having been added in the Constitution of India that a right to contest election for an office in Panchayat may be said to be a constitutional right and a right originating in the Constitution and given shape by a statute. But even if, it cannot be equated with a fundamental right. It is stated that there is nothing wrong in the same statute which confers the right to contest an election also to provide for the necessary qualifications without which a person cannot offer his candidature for an elective office and also to provide for disqualifications which would disable a person from contesting for, or from holding, an elective statutory office.

It was held in Rajbala (supra) that the right to contest for a seat in either of the two bodies is subject to certain constitutional restrictions and could be restricted further only by a law which the parliament made.

Further, the court added that Singh did not have any right to contest election to the Rajya Sabha in terms of the law made by the Parliament.

The Court stated while dismissing the SLP that the Representation of People Act, 1950 read with the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 has contemplated the name of a candidate to be proposed while filling the nomination form. However, it cannot be claimed by an individual that he has a right to contest election and the said stipulation violates his fundamental right, so as to file his nomination without any proposer as is required under the Act.

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Post-conviction compounding of offences is permissible: Himachal Pradesh High Court

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The Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case Shri Kantu Ram v Shri Beer Singh recently observed that a court, while exercising powers under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and can proceed to compound the offences even after recording of conviction by the courts below.

The bench comprising of Justice Sandeep Sharma observed in a case where the revision Petitioner, who was convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act by the Magistrate Court and was aggrieved by subsequent dismissal of appeal by the Sessions Court and had agreed to pay the amount due and settle the matter.

Thus, the petitioner had sought compounding of offences.

In the present case, the respondent admitted the factum with regard to receipt of the amount due from the accused and expressed that the prayer made on behalf of accused for compounding of offence can be accepted.

However, the High Court allowed the prayer and the offence committed by the Petitioner under Section 138 NI Act was ordered to be compounded.

The Court observed that the Reliance was placed on Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663, wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that court, while exercising power under Section 147 of the NI Act and can proceed to compound the offence even after recording of the conviction by the courts below.

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‘Pensionary benefits to employee, who is removed from service for misconduct, is not at par with those who retire on superannuation’

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The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court in the case Bashir Ahmad Wani v Jammu and Kashmir Grameen Bank and Another recently observed and stated that an employee who is removed from service for misconduct is not at par with those who is being retired on superannuation.

The bench comprising of Justice Sanjeev Kumar observed while dismissing the pension claim made by a former employee of the J&K Grameen Bank, who was removed from service in 2011.

In the present case, the petitioner had sought benefit of the J&K Grameen Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 2018 whereby provision was made for terminal benefits.

However, the court disallowed the claims on two grounds:

Firstly, that at the time of removal of the petitioner from service when there were no norms, rules or regulations providing for the benefit of pension to the employees of the respondent-Bank.

In the year 2011, the employees of the respondent-Bank were governed by the J&K Grameen Bank ( the Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010… it is abundantly clear that it does not prescribe imposition of a penalty of removal along with the pensionary benefits.

Secondly, it was opined by the court that though the 2018 Regulations had been made applicable to those employees who were in service between 1st day of September, 1987 and 31st day of March, 2010 and the employees retired from the services of the Bank before 31st day of March, 2018, however, this leeway cannot come to aid of the Petitioner.

The Curt observed that the reason for finding that the Petitioner was not an employee who had “retired” on superannuation from the bank. Rather, he was “removed” for misconduct.

The Court stated that the regulations apply to those employees who retired from the service of the Bank before 31.03.2018 and not the employees who were terminated for misconduct. Viewed thus, the order of removal of the petitioner dated 02.09.2011 holding the petitioner entitled to terminable benefits and cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be construed to be an order of removal with the benefit of the pension. Neither, the petitioner, at the time of his removal from service, nor with the promulgation of Pension Regulations of 2018, is entitled to the benefit of pension.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition.

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